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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1887

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BRIEFS

SEMINAR HELD FOR AFRICANS--CSSR's Central Trade Union Council Secretary V. Kozik received on 26 May the trade union functionaries from Portuguese-speaking African nations who attended a 6-week seminar held by the Central School of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH). The African guests were highly appreciative of the all-round assistance offered to them by the ROH, the trade union school, the T.U. functionaries and factory workers during their stay in the CSSR. [Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 27 May 81 p 2]

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COMMANDERS OF WORKERS GUARD HOLD CONFERENCE

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 26 Apr 81 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Mihaly Korom's Talk at a National Conference of Workers Guard Commanders"]

[Text] At the Villanyi Street Educational Center of the MSZMP Budapest Committee, the commanders of the workers guards held a 2-day national conference Saturday at which Mihaly Korom, member of the MSZMP Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, spoke. Janos Borbandi, deputy premier of the Council of Ministers, was present.

In his comments, Mihaly Korom thanked the workers guard on behalf of the Central Committee, conveyed the greetings and good wishes of Janos Kadar, the first secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee, and praised the activity of the workers guard. Among other things, he emphasized that it had successfully carried out its tasks. It stands firmly on the basis of the party's policy, and its political spirit and training meet requirements. The workers guard watches reliably--in good cooperation with the armed forces and bodies of our country--over our socialist order and achievements. With its activity the workers guard serves well in strengthening the link between the party and the people and their mutual confidence. The name of the body itself faithfully expresses the fact that the workers guard is one of the depositaries of the revolutionary traditions of the workers movement, an important school of communist education, where party members and nonmembers work in agreement for the same goals. The workers guard is an organic and irreplaceable part of the political system of our society.

Moreover, he pointed out that for their firmness the respect and esteem of the population surrounds the workers guards because they are always present where something needs to be done or help given. The population also regards them with particular respect because it knows that they carry out their service voluntarily, selflessly, and largely by giving up their leisure time, and that in their activity is expressed the conscious subordination of individual interests to the goals of the community. Everyone knows that the workers guard can always be counted on securely in every situation. Another source of the respect they enjoy is the fact that in addition to their armed service they hold their ground in an exemplary way at work places.

Thereafter Mihaly Korom spoke of timely domestic and foreign political matters. He noted that the sharpening of tensions in the international situation and the internal economic difficulties have an effect also on the workers guards. This, however, is a factor not for disbanding but for renewed efforts. It is an important task that we intensify our alertness against every imperialist attempt and effort, that we strengthen the unity of the socialist community and its protective power in guarding the achievements of socialism.

In our country the power of the working class and of the people is firm, the party's leading role is realized accordingly, and we work in a healthy political atmosphere. This is due to the self-sacrificing work and political maturity of the party's Marxist-Leninist policy and of the working millions--communists and noncommunists. In speaking of the tasks, the secretary of the Central Committee emphasized that the major task is now to guard the results that have been obtained thus far. We can contribute best to this end by everyone continuing to perform his work with great responsibility and devotion as heretofore. This is also the special task of the workers guard.

It is also the task of the body to improve communist education work and make it more substantive, for which there is also reason because new generations are entering into the ties of workers guards. One of the bases of the moral-political force of the workers guard is its social voluntary nature, and this must continue to be protected. The party and the working people will continue to assure the conditions necessary for carrying out the service. The experiences gained in a quarter of a century work by the workers guard, its strengthened position which has developed over the years, and the great respect it enjoys provide good bases for further development--Mihaly Korom said in conclusion.

Speakers at the 2-day conference emphasized that the workers guard is an institution of the socialist society, which with the direct guidance of the party and in the spirit of the party's policy gathers together the tens of thousands of workers. In his concluding remarks, Sandor Borbely, the national commander of the workers guard emphasized: In the true sense of the word the members of the workers guard are public men, active representatives, implementers, and protectors of party policy. These are the main characteristics of the body, and these features must be further developed in the future.

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NEED FOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM DISCUSSED

Budapest IFJU KOMMUNISTA in Hungarian No 3, pp 2-8

[Interview with Andras Knopp, deputy department chief of the Central Committee of the MSZMP by Sandor Rege]

> [Text] Our higher education is facing reform. Recently there has been a lot of talk about its causes and its necessity. Of course, today the concerns of secondary school students aspiring for university education are different from those of university or college students, or recent university graduates, or teachers, or enterprise managers...These are all a welter of viewpoints, arguments, attitudes, opinions, desires, worries, and, in some cases, aggravation and unleashed tension...

[Question] What is the state of affairs of Hungarian higher education, what are the tasks of its development--this is what we asked Andras Knopp about, deputy department chief of the Central Committee of the MSZMP.

[Answer] The state of affairs of our higher education, to give a comprehensive evaluation in simple sentence, is not bad. We are not dealing with its reform because higher education has any great problems. Our university-college education has developed in a positive fashion in the past 35 years. This development is primarily conspicuous from a quantitative point of view. And this is understandable. The progress of the country has needed and will need in the future a large number of specialists with advanced academic degrees. For instance, in Hungary 1.2 percent of the population over age 25 graduated from schools of higher learning in 1938, and 1.9 percent in 1949. According to the preliminary data of the latest 1980 census, this rate is 7 percent. The number of university students has increased eight and a half-fold in the last 40 years.

These are significant achievements that could be publicized more widely with justified pride.

[Question] Of course, there are quantitative indicators.

[Answer] Of course, we are not only talking about quantitative progress. Higher education has been modernized in substance too. A number of new specialties have emerged and technical and scientific training has been considerably expanded. Keeping pace with modern, scientific achievements, the emergence of Marxist

viewpoint and its advancement has also resulted in significant increase of standards in the area of social science education. The democratization of higher education, the "rearrangement" in the social makeup of students, the fact that the gates of universities and colleges have been opened wide for the children of workers and peasants, and also the dramatic increase of the number of female students have to be considered a qualitative change. On the other hand, it must also be considered that higher education does not only produce specialists with advanced degrees, it also educates intellectuals. The intelligentsia that has been trained by Hungarian higher education in the past three and a half decades has contributed, in no small measure, with its expertise and human and political loyalty to the social progress and political stability that can also be cited with modest but justifiable pride.

[Question] How do we rate in comparison with international standards?

[Answer] Certain fields of our higher education are among the best in the world. For instance, such is higher agricultural education whose achievements both in quantitative and qualitative respects have played a crucial role in the fact that Hungarian agriculture has fought its way up to the forefront of world agriculture in the last two decades. Obviously, it can be attributed to higher education that today in Hungary the number of college graduates employed in agriculture is the highest in the world, moreover the number of agrarian specialists per 100,000 people in this country is also the highest in the world.

But within higher education the number of students majoring in agriculture is among the highest too. Although this could be regarded as disproportionate with respect to education generally, nevertheless, the result indicates that the training of highly skilled specialists, if you like their "production," is a very useful and effective investment. It is worth discussing this separately, for questions of viewpoint may also crop up whenever the dimensions and development of higher education are talked about.

For instance, education is listed among the standards of living of the population in national economic plans, whereas in party documents and hence in congressional resolutions too, it is one of the issues of cultural and ideological life. Of course, education is justified to be placed here, but it does not reflect accurately what these documents say or what we say about the increased role of the human element in solving contemporary problems of our economic and social progress. According to an analysis of the World Bank, educational investments are among those with the fastest return. Primarily in developed countries, because highly trained experts and in general skilled manpower resources are a factor of infrastructure that is the motor of economic growth. The recovery rate of educational investments according to this World Bank analysis exceeds 20 percent. It is also worth discussing this matter, because the increased importance of higher education is a general, worldwide trend. There seems to be no limit to the number and rate of experts with advanced training beyond which demand for them does not increase. This is related to the accelerated rate of scientific and technical progress that is taking place in this age and time, but in addition highly trained experts generally rapidly affect growth of the work ethic and also the rise of the general level of education. The rate of growth of the numbers of those in higher education exceed the rate of growth of the economy worldwide.

[Question] But what is the situation in times of economic hardship?

[Answer] A desirable number and rate of highly trained specialists is always an important condition of economic growth. Right now we are experiencing a period of economic difficulty: the dynamics of economic growth have slowed down. However, it would not be right for anybody to conclude that the number of those in higher education has to be reduced. This could have grave consequences later when economic growth again accelerates. Of course, it is important to be thrifty in every area, including higher education, and I will discuss separately how efficiency can open up a lot of inner reserves. But to reduce the number of experts with advanced training--is not the way to economize.

[Question] Then in general our situation is not bad. Still a lot of contradictions hide beneath the surface. For instance, here is the number of university students, i.e., those that can attempt to obtain education at a high level...

[Answer] If we look at the numerical growth of people with degrees, we indeed have fine results. The same thing approached from a different angle, compared to international standards, does indeed hide a number of contradictions. We place last in Europe with respect to the number and rate of university students. Well, what is the explanation for this? One of the explanations is that the interpretation of the functions of higher education differs from country to country. We still consider the main function to be the training of qualified specialists. In other countries, universities offer more than degree programs. They also participate in various forms of education above the secondary level, in English called "postsecondary" education. Consequently, higher education encompasses a much broader activity. The other factor that has not been developed here yet, is the so-called "postgraduate" training. At our universities training is conducted primarily to attain degrees, i.e., postgraduate training is not included in higher education. Neither does participation in it show up among the statistical indicators of higher education. Another serious distorting factor is our seeming "efficiency."

[Question] How can effectiveness distort?

[Answer] Genuine effectiveness cannot only. The matter in question is that our higher education is not properly selective. All over the world, in socialist and capitalist countries alike, the drop out rate in higher education is higher than in this country, because a strong internal selection mechanism prevails. In this respect, "efficiency" is the highest in our higher education: out of 100 first year students 94 will get a degree. It is not so certain that this high "efficiency" is beneficial. As a matter of comparison: there are even some socialist countries where the drop out rate is 30 percent but, for instance, in Sweden it is 50 percent. Therefore, due to the lack of such an internal selectivity the strange contradiction arises that it is not in higher education where it is decided who will get a degree but before that. A preselection mechanism prevails here: approximately 11-12 percent of an age group will be admitted to higher education of whom 94 percent will graduate with a degree. But it is not certain whether it is good that the decision who is fit to be a doctor, engineer, or a teacher is made before the higher education level. This is one side of the problem. And the other side is that in other countries, both socialist and capitalist,

the number of students is also higher because they have to admit 25-30 percent more applicants in order to graduate an equal number of students [that we do], say, per 10,000 people a higher drop-out rate. At the same time, the way the number of students evolves is also an important indicator, because it is not only those with degrees who contribute to the cultural and work standards of society but also those who may have spent only one, two, or three years at a university. However, this also requires a change in attitudes and, of course, our system of training highly qualified specialists ought to be changed in substance too: somehow we should also give social recognition to partial education, for obviously it is also valuable.

[Question] Since selection has been brought up, let us talk about it. Especially, because our admission system causes a lot of social anxiety. What are the deficiencies and how can they be changed?

[Answer] In this country it is not the admission system that makes the selection. Admission is just the last stop in the selection process. Selection occurs back in elementary school, at the latest, at age 14. This is the main problem, as the situation is the following: 55 percent of gymnasium graduates will be admitted to full-time higher level studies in their graudation year or within one or two years. This rate is only 19 percent for technical high schools. On further analysis of data, the following are evident: 75-80 percent of a certain age group of gymnasium graduates will have earned a degree by age 30. After all, there are also night courses and correspondence programs and gymnasium graduates predominate in these programs too. Although hardly anybody could insist that 80 percent of a class of gymnasium graduates is suited to obtain higher level education. This is such a high rate that we can say: the training of an elite is happening in gymnasiums, but it is not certain that it is at the level characteristic of an elite. The better chance of gymnasium graduates to attain for post secondary education can also shed light on the cause of another problem, namely two-thirds of students attending gymnasiums are girls. It follows inevitably from this why the rate of women students grows rapidly, especially in certain institutes of higher education. Even these phenomena indicate the faults of the selection system, but the admission system is not the cause of all of this. I do not want to defend the admission system by this, I only want to indicate that by merely correcting the system the problems in question can hardly be changed. There is need for certain modifications in admission requirements, primarily for facilitating the specialized higher education of technical high school graduates. But here again the core of the problem presents itself beforehand.

Technical high schools are by nature dedicated for preparation of specialized higher education. Consequently, no matter what is done with admissions, it will not assure equal chances for others to attain higher education in the case of certain careers, i.e., medical, legal, liberal arts or economic fields except for [those attending] a few technical high schools with this type of curriculum. This is why I say that the main problem of our educational system is narrow specialization. I will dwell on this separately in the context of higher education. All in all this means the scarcity of available supply. However, preselection gives rise to other social problems too.

[Question] it is a major issue who aim to attain higher education, why, and how

[Answer] Yes, such a concern is the higher education of the children of manual workers. Most manual workers prefer to send their children to institutions teaching technical skills. This will mean a forced career at the outset and even in the best circumstances less chance for further study at an advanced level or more limited opportunity for choosing a career. However, somehow this also indicates that intellectual careers do not have enough appeal. As sociologists would say the social prestige of knowledge is not sufficient. Thus, the expectations and dimensions of higher education do not quite manifest themselves as it would be desirable socially and politically.

The child of a doctor has a much better chance to become a doctor than the child of a manual worker. It is not because of the admission system but because a small fraction of them apply for this type of careers to begin with. Basically this is decided at age fourteen when they choose a secondary school, which is done not by the children but by the parents. Social environment and circumstances are fundamentally decisive in this choice. This is a proven sociological fact which, even if we are not entirely happy about it, we can hardly contest.

[Question] Of course, this is an educational problem too, primarily that of elementary schools. The crisis of education has been talked about for over a decade all over the world.

[Answer] Yes, this is not only a Hungarian phenomenon. If we just take a look at the number of applications, it is striking what an overapplication there is for legal and liberal arts careers while there are hardly a hundred applicants for a hundred available places in a number of technical careers. This reflects the lack of social prestige afforded to learning. But it also plays a role in the number of applications since young people prefer to choose programs of study i.e., law, liberal arts, and economics that do not offer training for a specific job. In actual practice, this way they can postpone the decision of choosing a career by 4-5 years.

[Question] Many people have asked what good is it to have admissions at all? Why cannot everybody enroll at a university like in many Western countries, for instance, like in France?

[Answer] It is not quite like that there either. Of course, there are universities in capitalist countries which open admissions. But, for instance, in England entrance examinations are required everywhere, and even in France one cannot be freely admitted to technical schools or to medical school. There is a rigorous entrance exam in those institutions also and highly selective. For instance, the medical profession protects itself and its interests in a caste-like fashion and "regulates" how many future doctors will be admitted to the profession, of course this also to a great extent determines the income situation.

[Question] Just like in this country?

[Answer] No, although it is also regulated in this country how many students are admitted to a program of study this is based, however, upon the plans and projections of the need for specialists.

Few people know that because of stronger competition it is much more difficult to be admitted to a medical school in the U.S. or France than in this country. But in France one can be admitted to a teacher's college only through an entrance exam. Thus wherever graduation leads to a so-called "license" admission is also regulated.

[Question] It is obvious that we cannot saturate our universities, especially because of the capacity of these institutions. It seems though that higher education has been fragmented and disseminated.

[Answer] Before looking at the economic side of the question, let us look at the substantive side. It is also related to the problems of extremely narrow specialization. Unfortunately, our higher education looks like a narrow system of pipes set side by side having an entrance and an exit. One can fall back in it but it is not possible to transfer to another program while en route on the analogy of communicating vessels or some other law of physics. Although it is not certain whether it can be decided about somebody at age eighteen what he is most suited for. This situation has a number of negative consequences, for higher education can hardly meet the demands of society and the economy in this way. Although it can be projected how many engineers will be needed by a large sector of industry, how many of them should be electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, and chemical engineers? Not to mention that in this country at present there are about 100 different engineering specialties; or that at the faculty or liberal arts in Budapest in combined subject fields specialists of a 140 different profiles are turned out. It is not certain that students have to be admitted to such narrow programs and that higher education has to be made to function in such rigid specialized structure. These seem to be problems of substance and education but they are also basic problems of efficiency. After all, if specialists who do not meet the requirements of the economy are educated, at least the same amount of waste is occurring as it does as a result of institutional fragmentation. Moreover, the latter is in such condition because the training of specialists has such a narrow profile.

[Question] Nevertheless, institutional fragmentation is also a substantive issue. For instance, nowadays it is being discussed with astonishment that a law school is going to be founded at Miskolc next to the technical university. There is not even a building available for it.

[Answer] In fact, this matter may seem to be contradictory, but it is a little more complex than that. Now, I do not want to defend the law school at Miskolc. There are small matters that are worth defending and big ones that are not. A class of a hundred students at a law school is not small. Essentially law schools mean one specialty because there is no further specialization at these schools. This is one side of the question. The other side is: there used to be law training at Miskolc, it is not a new thing. After the Treaty of Trianon the Evangelical Law Academy of Eperjes was relocated there and it was functioning for decades. There used to be a law school at Sarospatak too. These are historical facts. But here the issue is not whether education is further fragmented. The replacement of lawyers is a problem, the profession has become senescent, and no one disputes the fact that there is a shortage of lawyers. The legal education has to be increased by all means, but this is not possible at the existing law schools. Unfortunately, in this country social science and technical education have become widely separately without any

reason. And even though the siting at Miskolc seems to be bizarre in the light of the less progressive traditions of our higher education, it was a conscious decision to found the needed fourth law school here in Northern Hungary where there is no social science education whatsoever. Let me also add that it was also the most advantageous solution from an economic viewpoint.

[Question] In other words, the communicating vessel of a pipe system...?

[Answer] Actually, this is a step toward bringing different types of specialist training closer together. After all, there is ever more talk about industrial rights and patent rights and specialists well-versed in them have to be trained too, because innovative activity has an ever greater influence and function.

This type of cooperation between technical and legal training can be productive. And as far as postgraduate training is concerned: it will be obviously easier to solve the legal training of technical school graduates at Miskolc.

[Question] I was not necessarily attacking this matter, there was only need for some explanation...

[Answer] But it may be that it is attacked, that is why I went into detail...But let us stay in this area if we want a bad example of location. For instance, such is Kazincbarcika. The Chemical Industrial Automatization College is functioning there; isolated and far from the university centers. This alone would not be a problem, for the Borsod Chemical Combine is there too. The trouble is that there is a nationwide overproduction in this field. There is this type of training both at Kecskemet and at Pecs. In addition, for years there have been 70-80 applicants for a hundred places at Barcika of whom 50-60 meet the standards under the best circumstances and capacity is filled up by transfers. The fewest number of positions for technical school graduates have been advertised for years for graduates from Barcika. In addition, education of this kind has a high requirement for instruments, equipment, and chemicals, etc. The annual cost of educating a lawyer is approximately 20,000 forints; to train a plant engineer at Barcika costs 100,000 forints, twice as much as at other technical colleges. Here, of course, the number of students and the size of the institutions also play a role. Of course, the same question presents itself in a different way, say in teacher training. I do not believe that training kindergarten teachers by the thousands is efficient, nor do I believe that it is economical because then a college with a capacity of a thousand students has to be built somewhere...Thus, these types of institutions still have to be operated in a decentralized manner...It is also justified by the geographical "scattering" of jobs.

[Question] Nonetheless, it is rather strange that training of teachers is going on in 40 different places at different levels...

[Answer] Yes, that is too many. But in part it is related to another problem. We do not have 40 teacher's colleges, but we do train teachers at a number of places whose specialty is not teacher training. For instance, there is teacher training for trade schools and technical high schools at technical colleges too. To mention an example: there is a teacher's college a Pecs and an elementary school teacher training institute at Gyor. Both cities there also have technical colleges. Even

though the two schools are 200-300 meters apart at Pecs, a faculty of pedagogy has also been established at the technical university. At Gyor the distance between the two institutes is also only a few hundred meters, and the situation is essentially the same in Budapest. This is uneconomical and unjustified from a professional point of view. To assure properly trained instructors in so many institutes--we are certainly incapable of. Therefore, a far reaching contraction will have to be carried out in this area in the coming years. And at this juncture, we shall also have to examine whether the present four-tier structure of teacher training is justified. That is to say, the fact that teachers are separately trained for kindergartens, for the lower and upper grades of elementary schools, and for secondary educational institutions. This will also have to be examined. Let us start from the fragmentation of education and in its wake let us examine institutional fragmentation...

[Question] The training of chemists is a good example of this...

[Answer] Yes, the above-cited problem of Barcika is also related to this. Chemists are trained at all university science faculties, at the Technical University of Budapest, at the University of Chemical Industry at Veszprem, etc.... Relatively speaking small numbers are in question. There are 750 students at the Technical University of Budapest and circa 600 at Veszprem. At both places there is one instructor for about three students. But the situation is the same at the science faculties in Budapest, Debrecen, and Szeged...These are faculties of the same profile and providing them with sophisticated instruments and chemicals is going to be an ever more difficult task. They cannot function efficiently in such a small country. It is this kind of fragmentation that is neither warranted from an educational viewpoint, nor does it facilitate the efficiency of education. Without more efficient utilization of available resources the tasks of coming years cannot be carried out even within individual institutes. Rigid fragmentation of faculties often means parallel investments, duplicative procurement of instruments, books and periodicals. This places an extraordinarily heavy burden on us in addition to increasing prices and inflation and we are less and less capable of keeping pace.

[Question] Overproduction, fragmentation, narrow specialization, and a host of problems of location. How could this be alleviated? Are there any ideas to reduce the contradictions?

[Answer] Yes, there are. The elaboration of the concept of long-range development of higher education has been going on for some time and this was preceded by a detailed analysis of the situation. About 150 experts took part in this work and the analysis as well as the proposals were widely discussed by leaders and teachers of universities and colleges, but the leaders of KISZ organizations of higher educational institutes are also familiar with this analysis and several forums of the Central Committee of KISZ have also given their opinions on this motion. Recently the Political Committee has also stated its position on the tasks of development of higher education.

The main concepts of this position are: emphasis on qualitative development in all areas, most of all the raising of educational standards by way of qualitative improvement of the teaching staff; establishment of better harmony of secondary and

higher education, the gradual dissolution of too rigid functional fragmentation of secondary education (training of skilled workers, trade high schools, and gymnasiums) through the rapprochement of various types of schools; broader-based general education, deferral of specialization, establishment of postgraduate training on a broad basis, and completion of the postgraduate training system; more vigorous rationalization and concentration of the network of higher education and the reduction of fragmentation. This will have to be worked out in detail within the framework of a long-range development concept. The plan for this will have to be completed and submitted to the government by 1985.

[Question] Why does it have to be postponed to 1983 if such extensive analytical work has already been done?

[Answer] The work completed thus far, the analysis of the situation of higher education proves that if higher education is to meet the demands of our time at the level of its present achievements or at an even higher level, it will not be able to meet these demands without a well-considered, thorough-going, and well-prepared modernization. However, what this means in concrete terms in the education of technical specialists, doctors, or teachers can only be worked out on the basis of recently approved comprehensive goals and guidelines already drafted. This work is just about to start and it will have to be completed by 1983. Anyway, two or three years do not amount to "delay" in the elaboration of an educational reform, for education is a system "rigid" enough for the impact of the intended changes to be felt. By this I mean that for instance, the effectiveness of the new university curriculum reform to be introduced this year can be evaluated 5 years from now at the earliest, since that is when students educated in accordance with the new curriculum will graduate.

And if an entire educational system including the target system is to be reformed, the "lead time" is even longer, because, as mentioned before, not only graduate training is to be modernized, but also, for instance, the system of postgraduate education is to be developed on a long-range basis. However, such a comprehensive development concept has to be prepared very thoroughly and that requires time. Another factor that warrants that a final decision about the details of the modernization of higher education postponed is that the drafting of a long-range development concept of public education is planned, and it is obvious that the development goals of these two interlocking educational systems have to be coordinated. According to plans the development plan of higher education and the long-range development concept of public education are to be submitted to the plenary session of the Central Committee still this year.

[Question] And what is going to happen until 1983?

[Answer] The analytical work done so far has brought up to the surface a number of issues whose solution does not have to await an extensive reform. Some of these have already been started and the solution of others is being dealt with by the Ministry of Education and other ministries interested in the administration of higher education. Of course, we have to be aware of the fact that some of the apparent problems of higher education or those that are regarded as such can be understood only in the context of wider social correlations, and in some cases cannot even be alleviated by any amount of overhaul of higher education. Thus,

for instance, the coordination of higher education and the demands placed on it by society can obviously be improved, more accurate and thorough projections of the need for specialists can be prepared, but the job placement problems of specialists starting their careers and their adaptation to the work environment also indicate a series of concerns for occupational policy and manpower utilization.

The decisive factor is the recognition of the increasing social importance of educating highly trained specialists and acknowledging the crucial role of the human element, and the understanding of the necessity for more rational and more effective utilization of the intellectual capacity of the nation. This was the goal of the work accomplished hitherto and it is hoped that this will also be its result.

9133
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CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS OF VARIOUS VOIVODSHIPS DESCRIBED

Zielona Gora Voivodship

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 5, May 80 pp 24-26

[Article by Col (Academy Graduate) Zbigniew Gubala, head of the WIOC (Voivodship Inspectorate for Civil Defense) in Zielona Gora]

[Text] The population of Zielona Gora Voivodship numbers approximately 600,000. It is an industrial-agricultural region, with well-developed electromachine, light, foodstuffs and mineral industries. The socialized sector dominates in the agricultural economy. Forestry plays a significant role (nearly half of the area of the voivodship is covered by forests). The concentration of industry in this area is low, and the average population density is not great (66 persons per km^2). These characteristics of the voivodship affect the forms and manner of civil defense preparations here.

Civil defense is integrally connected with the structure and functioning of administrative, economic and social units in Zielona Gora Voivodship, as it is throughout the rest of Poland. We consider the implementation of OC [Civil Defense] tasks as defined by Resolution No 111 of the Council of Ministers, which was adopted in 1973, to be an integral part of the daily operation of state administrative organs toward fulfilling the policy outlined by the PZPR.

It has operated for over 4 years within the system of the bilevel administrative division of the country. This has enabled us to develop principles of operation for guaranteeing the proper implementation of OC tasks in units both at the voivodship level and at the basic level. At the foundations of these principles lies not only the official range of duties, but also substantial knowledge about the subject of the operation. Thus we place great emphasis on training activities. Directors of Voivodship Office [VW] departments and heads of units attain basic knowledge about OC preparedness during 3-day training sessions devoted to the subject of defense. These sessions are organized annually by the Voivodship Defense Committee.

On the other hand, the directorial cadre of OC units, other office workers and OC instructors are summoned for training to the Voivodship Center for Cadre Training. From 1976 to 1979, nearly 900 persons were trained in this manner.

The actual planning of OC projects is an important factor in the progress evident in the implementation of civil defense tasks. These projects are brought to the

attention of all organs and persons responsible for their implementation. To this end, briefings are held with OC chiefs and permanent OC employees in Voivodship Office departments and in other offices at the beginning of each calendar year. The chiefs are made aware of the organizational and coordinating elements of OC endeavors issuing from their obligations as OC chiefs. On the other hand, these matters are given detailed, more practical treatment in discussions with employees, since they are the executive apparatus of OC chiefs in towns and rural communes.

Annual planning issues from the plan to perfect the voivodship defense system worked out for the 5-year period. It is based on the appropriate guidelines provided by the Committee for National Defense and the OC chief of the nation. The annual plan for the implementation of tasks in the field of defense for our voivodship is comprised, in the first place, of the guidelines of the voivodship governor, the chief of civil defense, and numerous schedules. The latter includes a calendar of primary projects and detailed plans for carrying out such projects, as, e.g., exercises in which OC forces participate, supervision of the maintenance of OC equipment, the role of alarm sentries in WOPOIAL [Voivodship Center for National Warning and Alert] training sessions and the allocation of funds.

These documents are gone over thoroughly during briefings and training sessions. They are also the basis of the layout of detailed plans for the implementation of OC tasks in UW departments and in city and rural commune offices. Moreover, the WIOC [Voivodship Inspectorate of Civil Defense] lays out plans for the supervision of the implementation of OC tasks and for the inspection of existing protective shelters, as well as plans for OC popularization-propaganda undertakings and activities for improving the WIOC. These plans enable the improved coordination and supervision of the implementation of OC questions.

We place great emphasis in our work on preparing OC forces for lifesaving tasks by means of training. The highest form of training is practical exercises (mock lifesaving drills). In the 5-year training cycle, the first exercises are conducted as staff officer activities. The TOC [Territorial Civil Defense] officers' cadre all the way up to the head of the TOC service as well as employees of the city (rural commune) office take part. The use of OC forces in this exercise is limited to the basic services of the OC unit (communications, alert, services pertaining to the maintenance of order and providing protection and the like). Against the background of the tactical assumption, OC tasks characteristic for a period in which the security of the state is threatened are implemented the raising of the level of preparedness of OC forces); these forces are also directed in lifesaving actions on city (rural commune) premises.

The second set of exercises is conducted with the full participation of OC forces. It consists of the use of these forces in lifesaving actions on the premises of the town. Against the background of the tactical assumption, the characteristic undertakings, such as detection, radioactive and chemical decontamination, the extinguishing of fires, first aid to the wounded and mechanical work are implemented. These training assumptions are combined with economic and defense-service operations. We include the population of cities and villages, as well as the crews in work enterprises in these operations. In 1979, the value of socially and economically useful operations amounted to approximately 530,000 zlotys.

Attesting to the worth of this form of organizing the populace is the role that it has played in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters which occur

within our voivodship in the form of floods (e.g., in 1977/1978), massive snowfalls (e.g., during the winter of 1978/1979) and forest fires.

It has become obvious in practice that the present organizational structure of OC units must be modified to some degree. This results from the need for better contact between OC detachments and the home territory. The area of the rural commune is so vast that it cannot be treated as a unit from the viewpoint of a danger that threatens. Villages (village administrator's offices) are endangered localities on the territory of rural communes and it seems that because of them we must build a civil defense force in the area of general rescue operations. Only such specialized maneuver subunits as, e.g., the fire department, medical forces, detection and decontamination groups and the like should come under the management of the head administrator as OC chief. These subunits could be aided by general rescue groups within a particular village administrator's offices. We also hold that it is not essential that all members of general rescue groups be given organizational-mobilization assignments. Assignments should be given only to those persons in directorial positions in these groups and specialized subunits. With regard to those remaining, it is enough to make use of the provisions of Resolution No 112 of the Council of Ministers dated 18 May 1973, concerning the training of the populace (the obligation to participate in exercises--in a continuous session of up to 12 hours once every 2 years).

In exercises held for voivodship administrative officials and OC forces, civil defense issues are interwoven with general defense issues. The "two calendars" of these exercises (WKO [Voivodship Defense Committee] and OC), the separate use of which has been obligatory to date, should have been combined and a team designated by the WKO should have directed the defense exercises. It seems that OC exercises within the scope of the voivodship could relate only to special OC issues such as universal warning, the detection and analyses of contaminants and the like.

The WOPOIAL in Zielona Gora has been modernized; the system of radiotelephone communications as a basic means for directing civil defense has undergone systematic expansion. Ten or more of our alarm sirens have been installed in newly built housing developments. This year we are testing the use of specialists and equipment from the Polish Shortwave Radio Operators Union to serve the needs of civil defense. We envision great practical utility from the work of this social organization.

We are also expanding civil defense in the voivodship thanks to cooperation with several social organizations, particularly the PCK [Polish Red Cross], the Aeroclub of the Polish People's Republic and the TWO [Society for Defense Knowledge]. Joint training-propaganda endeavors of the WIOC, the Department of Education and Upbringing and the Voivodship Headquarters OHP [Volunteer Labor Brigades] such as contests of OC knowledge and winning merit badges for OC proficiency have become permanent projects on the calendar.

An important element in voivodship civil defense management is inspection activity. We are implementing inspections in basic units within the framework of a comprehensive inspection developed by the WKO Secretariat and the Department of Control and Training. Two days are made available to the WIOC for the inspection of OC affairs in the city and rural commune office. The criteria for the inspections are based on the set of instructions entitled "On Inspection Activity in OC Units."

The inspection of select ministry units located on the terrain of the voivodship is performed by the WIOC in accordance with the annual inspection plan. The scope of the inspection is somewhat different from that of units which come under the voivodship governor; however, the voivodship governor, as OC chief, must be aware of the state of readiness of OC forces to implement tasks of voivodship civil defense. It seems to me that it is necessary for IOCK [Voivodship Inspectorate for Civil Defense] to establish certain directives in the area of joint inspection activity by voivodship ministries and institutions with reference to these units. The more problematic evaluation of the implementation of defense and OC tasks in administrative and ministerial units is performed by the WKO. These evaluations are carried out on the basis of information assembled personally by appointed leaders--OC chiefs and plant directors. This form of WKO operation places those persons responsible for the implementation of defense tasks in a very active position and it helps to improve the OC situation in their subordinate units.

On the basis of the plan for the implementation of OC tasks in our voivodship it may be assumed that we are conducting too broad an inspection operation of basic units. In practice, this is a very great help to these units in solving OC problems.

In the WIOC not only is a comparison made of the results of inspection, but units are also evaluated for their training activity, for the organization and level of exercises, attendance at training sessions, the condition of OC equipment and other matters. This comparison is the basis of the evaluation of the results of competition among units. The results of the competition are totaled at the end of the year, and all units fall in one of two groups. The first group includes those units which have an OC inspectorate and permanent employment positions in this field; the second group are those units which do not have permanent employment positions for OC matters. Certificates and awards are presented to those units which have distinguished themselves.

Undoubtedly, the methods of operation in the area of OC management in our voivodship outlined here are not a revelation--similar methods are used by other voivodships. Nonetheless, these methods have enabled us to achieve perceptible results.

This year we are making use of the foundation laid by our past wealth of experience in the field of civil defense in the voivodship as well as of a thorough analysis of its current state. This will enable the creation of a workable basis for civil defense planning and its implementation in the next five-year plan, as we take into account the provisions of the amended resolution concerning the universal obligation to defend the Polish People's Republic.

Gorzow Voivodship

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 6, Jun 80 pp 16-17

[Article by Stanislaw Nowak]

Gorzow Voivodship is located in northwest Poland. In area it represents one of the larger regions of the country, covering 848,400 hectares, of which 44.7 percent is farmland and 44.1 is forestland. Such as high percentage of forestland places the Gorzow Voivodship in third place throughout Poland in terms of forestage. The population count as of 31 December 1978 was approximately 444,000.

The voivodship is divided administratively into 2 cities, 19 city-rural communes and 19 rural communes.

Gorzow Voivodship is an industrial-agricultural region. These two divisions of the national economy, its variegated industry and expansive agriculture, have a dominant share in the national profit. Gorzow Voivodship is also an important region for tourism.

Its socioeconomic potential, its geographic situation, natural qualities and its basically well-developed tourism determines the place, role and tasks of civil defense in Gorzow Voivodship.

For this reason as well, the issues connected with the operation of civil defense in Gorzow Voivodship, which have been addressed since the opening of the new voivodship, lie at the heart of the interest of party authorities and administrative officials.

On the basis of guidelines established by the head of National Civil Defense and decisions handed down by the WKO [Voivodship Defense Committee], we have developed perspectives for a five-year plan of action in the area of setting up and implementing OC undertakings.

As the point of departure for our activities we have adopted the principle of adequately familiarizing all employees of local organs of the state and economic administration with the civil defense tasks of our voivodship.

In our enactment of the above principles, we have attempted, through theoretical and practical training, to reach the lowest directorial and management echelons.

The training of the directorial cadre of OC organs and forces has also had an effect on the total picture of civil defense undertakings implemented in cities and rural communes and in voivodship factories.

In our activities up to the present time, we have been most successful in implementing the following: preparing and insuring the operation of a system of universal warning and alert of the populace against the threat of strikes from the air, contamination and contagion, as well as of a system of detecting contamination. This system is based on the existing cooperation of the Citizens' Militia, the Fire Brigade and the health service. At the same time, in 1978 we embarked on the construction of a radiotelephone administrative network for the voivodship, which will be used for the purposes of warning and alert.

In the field of the comprehensive planning and implementation of OC at the city and rural commune levels, model OC plans have been worked out by the WIOC using the example of the Witnica city and rural commune and the Bogdaniec rural commune. These plans were discussed in detail in the course of training sessions; they have also been transmitted to all administrative units at the basic level.

Moreover, through cooperation with the Voivodship Military Headquarters [WSW], operational studies have been prepared and entered into the plan, as well as suggestions of a defensive nature relative to the territorial management of the voivodship.

The voivodship OC plan has been approved and has been highly rated by the Inspectorate of National Civil Defense [IOCK].

We have devoted a great deal of attention to matters of the organization of rescue forces in the voivodship, as well as to the civil defense structure. We have paid particular attention to local OC units, especially those units located in rural communes which are situated in the valleys of the Odra, Warta and Notec rivers.

It is in these valleys that it became necessary to call up additional forces in conjunction with the threat of flooding.

Currently we have 13 local civil defense units in our voivodship which are prepared to carry out antiflood measures. These are priority units in terms of supply and training. These units are located in the following regions:

--the Odra River--Kostrzyn, Slubice, Gorzyca, Boleszkowice;

--the Warta River--Bogdaniec, Witnica, Slonsk, Krzeszyce;

--the Notec River--Drezdenko, Stare Kurowo, Zwierzyn, Santok, Skwierzyna.

The need for these units was attested to in 1979, when antiflood activity lasted for 4 months, requiring the involvement of rescue units specializing in medical care, social care, veterinary care, firefighting, technical services and the like, for a combined total of nearly 3,000 persons, to eliminate the consequences of flooding.

It was due to the proper organizational preparations and the expert assistance at hand as well as theinvolvement and devotion of all those taking part that this action was effective and fully successful.

An important undertaking for preparing officials to direct defense affairs was training activity. This took various forms and used various methods. In our training activities, we paid special attention to the practical execution of tasks by the whole body of OC forces.

One such activity during the course of the last 5 years was the carrying out of three operational-tactical exercises, within the framework of which demonstrations and simulations of the practical operation of OC forces were played out.

Paralleling the implementation of the training process was our concerted effort to prepare, organize and supply the Voivodship Center for the Training of Cadres [WOSK]. This center was put into operation in the spring of 1979 and trains the OC directorial and instructional cadre, among others.

Much importance is attached to cooperation with army units stationed on our territory. Within the framework of such cooperation, in 1977-1978 an OC practice ground was developed jointly for the purpose of conducting rescue operations. Both army units and OC rescue forces make use of this testing ground on an equal basis.

The timely implementation of all civil defense tasks in the voivodship demands a major effort on the part of the directorship, permanent employees and OC activists. It would be difficult to single out all of those who are worthy of distinction, so let us limit ourselves to only those who are most noteworthy. These are the chiefs and employees in OC from the cities and city/rural communes of Kostrzyn, Debno, Slubice, Miedzyrzecz, and the chiefs and employees from the Bierzwnik, Miedzichowo

and Santok rural communes and from such factories as the CHEMITEX-STILON Chemical Fiber Plants in Gorzow, the District Equipment Plants and Timber Industry Plants in Barlink and the KOMES Clothing Plants in Slubice.

The achievements outlined here have been possible only because of the wholehearted support of party and administrative officials, the directorial and instructional cadre of OC, the members of units from the ranks as well as many OC activists and social organizations, all of whom cooperated in the implementation of civil defense tasks.

We have adopted the principle in the Gorzow Voivodship that OC heads at the basic level and directors of enterprises, factories and departments of the UW [Voivodship Office] present reports at WIOC [Voivodship Inspectorate of Civil Defense] meetings. Each meeting, in turn, is preceded by a quick inspection. This method produces very good results in the area of developing defense in our voivodship.

On the basis of our experiences in the past few years in the area of OC improvement, we will expand our efforts in conjunction with the organization and elimination of the potential consequences of contamination caused by toxic agents in industry over and above our present work in this field. This refers especially to the cities of Gorzow, Kostrzyn and Barlink. We will aim at maintaining the constant and continued efficiency and activism of OC officials and forces in taking quick action in situations of natural disasters, catastrophes and accidents.

We will continue to carry out preventive and propaganda activity in the area of protecting the natural environment. We will also continue to act in the name of preserving the tourist values of the Gorzow region.

With the support of WOSK, we are developing a practice base for the training of OC officials and forces for the voivodship.

As we implement the above projects, we will make the people of the voivodship aware of the fact that civil defense is necessary not only in a period of danger and warfare, but also today, particularly in the event of a natural disaster, a catastrophe or an accident.

I am convinced that if we have a self-sacrificing core of activists and a well-trained instructional cadre, and if we succeed in bringing society to understand the need to prepare for civil defense, we will be able to implement in full the tasks issuing from the domestic program of continued improvement of civil defense.

Olsztyn Voivodship

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 7, Jul 80 pp 16-18

[Article by Sergiusz Rubczewski, Chief of Provincial Civil Defense, Olsztyn Voivodship]

[Text] Olsztyn Voivodship occupies an area of over 12,300 km^2, or nearly 4 percent of Poland's total surface area. Approximately 2 percent of Poland's population lives in the voivodship. These two factors, as well as its considerable amount of forested land and the large number of natural water reservoirs distinguish the voivodship in a special way among the other regions of Poland and lend a specific character to its economy.

The Olsztyn region is not rich in mines and natural deposits of usefulness to man. It wealth lies in the beauty of its uncontaminated nature and the potential it has for intensive farm production. Making use of these natural values of the region and its developed socioeconomic conditions, we are intensively expanding this important sector of the national economy. The food economy represents a key direction of the socioeconomic development of the region. The level of collectivization of agriculture in Olsztyn voivodship is relatively high (50 percent). We are expanding high-yield production on state and cooperative farms, particularly in the northern part of the voivodship. Private farms predominate on the remaining areas of land. Their average size is over 10 hectares. In order to eliminate the losses incurred in transporting farm products produced in the voivodship to distant regions of Poland, we are trying to do a maximum amount of on-the-spot processing of farm products into foodstuffs ready for consumption. Practically all milk, grain and cattle processing are done here. Our goal is to create a single, internally harmonious technological flow of two separate sectors--agriculture and the processing industry.

The second direction of the socioeconomic development of the voivodship is industry, which is concentrated in cities. Its major sectors are the chemical industry, the electromachine industry, the timber industry and light industry. The continued development of industry, however, is contingent upon the need to protect the natural environment. This is why for several years now there have been more and more plants built on the basis of so-called free conditions for location, primarily with regard to plants of the electronics industry. This direction of industrial development of cities ensures the inhabitants of suitable work places; at the same time, the environment is protected.

The natural environmental values dictate a third function of the voivodship--the development of a tourist and rest-recreational base for working people throughout the country.

Implementing a decision of the state authorities, we organized the TOPL [Local Antiaircraft Defense] in the 1950's. With their assistance the forces and means needed to guarantee a peaceful existence and creativity in the building of socialism in Olsztyn Voivodship were expanded. We have continued this work through the years, gradually increasingly the defense achievements of the voivodship.

The development of military technology, particularly of weapons of mass destruction, forces us to continually improve our defense potential and to increase our concern over the protection of our citizenry. As a result of decisions of the political and state authorities bringing officials of the state administration into line on matters of civil defense, we are able to make daily links between socioeconomic activities and defense activities. Understanding the need for every citizen, every economic unit and every enterprise to work on behalf of defense, we set civil defense tasks before the directorship of all offices, plants and institutions for implementation. Adopting resolution of the Council of Ministers No 111/73 dated 18 May 1973 as the basis of our operation, we have paid special attention to the effective planning of tasks. We have concentrated our efforts on giving far-reaching aid in the development of civil defense plans to our 8 municipal offices, 13 municipal-rural commune offices and 35 rural commune offices, as well as to the more important factories in the region. The dynamic development of the voivodship, and especially of the socialized sector of agriculture, forces us to make continual improvements in our planning assumptions. We take such action following an examination of the status quo of current plans during training sessions and exercises with the staff of the directorial cadre of OC.

The vast territory of the voivodship and the existence of specialized farms and food warehouses within its territory demand that we pay particular attention to the expansion of systems of warning and alerting the populace, as well as of protection against contamination and contagion.

The basic means of warning the voivodship is wireless radio broadcasting from the local Polish Radio and Television station duplicated by the radiotelephone communications network of the UW [Voivodship Office], which reaches the whole voivodship. For the purposes of alert, we have centrally located alert systems in cities, and, in addition, a network of electrical sirens, the range of which includes all rural commune localities and 43 percent of all village localities. The organs for collecting and analyzing information about contamination and the network for the detection of contamination and contagion are closely linked with the system of warning and alert. In this way, the warning or alert of each citizen against a danger that threatens him is guaranteed, regardless of his whereabouts, within a very short time.

In preparing the voivodship farm for protection against contamination and contagion, we have selected an indispensable number of laboratories for cooperation with local health and epidemiological stations and veterinary establishments and centers for the purpose of determining the usability of edible food and fodder. With the aid of technical equipment at the disposal of agriculture, we are able in time of need to eliminate the consequences of possible contamination.

In our continued work we see the necessity of developing forms and methods for protecting large farms and farm plants against weapons of mass destruction.

In the past 5 years, we have effected the reorganization of civil defense forces, creating such forces not only in the larger urban concentrations, factories, rural communes and hamlets, but also wherever this was possible and needed. In general we have mobilized 5.5 percent of the populace of the voivodship into civil defense forces. We are devoting particular attention to the organization of technical rescue forces and to first aid medical units which have the broadest tasks in bringing help to disaster victims. Following our reorganization program we embarked upon an intensive program of basic and specialized training of these forces, and we also delineated their tasks in detail during peacetime and during wartime.

One of the fundamental tasks of civil defense in peacetime is training. It is through training that the members of OC units and the remainder of the populace imbibe basic knowledge about protecting life and property and bringing help to disaster victims. We have already reached the adequate level of training the directorial cadre at all levels of the civil defense leadership. We believe that they are ready to fulfill OC tasks. The numerous exercises conducted by civil defense chiefs in cities and rural communes have shown this. The cadre of OC instructors, commanders of units and chiefs of services have likewise been properly prepared for training and educational activities. By stages, we are training private groups in the systems of universal warning and alert and in the analysis of contamination, preparing them for the independent fulfillment of tasks. Periodical training sessions and practical exercises are conducted with the close cooperation of the Voivodship Office of Telecommunications, the Polish Radio and Television Station, the PKP [Polish State Railways] Directorship, the Voivodship MO [Citizens' Militia] Commanders and the Fire Brigade. We are systematically improving the organization and forms of training the populace. We have already trained approximately 250,000 persons. In some factories, a form of self-study has been introduced:

to this end a mimeographed lecture has been developed and printed (one copy is provided for every 7-10 persons). This lecture contains basic information in the field of OC. The Department of Education and Upbringing in its own training center conducts classes with 260 middle school students in the course of a year. Some of these students merit the title of OC Youth Instructor.

For several years we have been carrying out staff exercises in Olsztyn on an annual basis with the commanders of groups of rescue units, and we have also conducted practical exercises with each group itself. The city mayor personally directs these exercises; the WPO [Voivodship Defense Committee] has a special interest in these exercises.

That the necessary level of training of the directorial cadre and civil defense forces had been attained, and that the appropriate preparations for the execution of planned tasks had been made was attested to in the exercises known under the cryptonym NAREW-79. The basic task in this exercise was the practical operation of OC forces on behalf of defense forces. The exercise demonstrated the completely realistic nature of the planning assumptions and practical tasks which had been adopted.

Apart from the undeniable training benefits of OC exercises for OC forces, each drill likewise reaps measurable economic benefits, since each exercise concludes with a project which is of social usefulness to the economy of a given city, rural commune or factory. The value of such labors up to the present time runs into millions of zlotys. During the exceptionally hard winter of 1978-1979, approximately 37,000 persons were involved in efforts to clear the snow from the roads, hamlets, transportation lines and approaches to purchasing centers of meat and milk. They worked a total of 360,000 man-hours or more.

Another important course of action for the purpose of preparing society to live under the distinct conditions of wartime has been and continues to be the broad popularization of civil defense knowledge. Local party echelons instigate this activity. It is implemented by the WIOC and the MIOC [Urban Inspectorate for Civil Defense], the OC directorial cadre, commanders of OC units and youth organizations, both paramilitary and social. Especially valuable forms of this popularization activity are the numerous displays of OC equipment, photo-journals, lectures, local radio programs and spots about OC subjects shown in cinema theaters.

We also believe in the importance of the proper utilization of funds designated for the maintenance, upkeep, modernization and expansion of protective shelters, as well as equipment found in city and rural commune offices, by means of the creation of a storage base which conforms to the technical conditions. We are in the final phase of adapting a structure designated exclusively for storing the means of protection for serving the needs of the voivodship.

The range of civil defense tasks presented here--and this list is not exhaustive--confirms our conviction that they cannot be implemented in isolation from the general socioeconomic assumptions of the developmental plan for the voivodship. Our past achievements in the area of strengthening civil defense on our territory were made possible by the self-sacrificing work of the well-trained cadre of the WIOC and municipal OC inspectors.

Well-organized efforts, close cooperation with particular departments of the UW and the involvement of the civil defense chiefs of state administrative units have enabled us to develop the proper sort of operational concept for civil defense in the voivodship. In a similar fashion, the intense involvement of the broad masses of society, which carries out the decisions of the OC directorship effectively and with full understanding, has played an important role.

The results that we have achieved in recent years establish a good foundation for the further implementation of economic-defense tasks of the voivodship issuing from the resolution of the Eight PZPR Congress.

Each year we will develop and implement a plan of propaganda-informational undertakings having as a goal the political-defense education of society. We are counting on the continued popularization of civil defense questions. This year we are celebrating the 35th anniversary of the victory over Hitler's fascism. The field of the most important battle of Polish soldiers with the Knights of the Cross--Grunwald--is located on Olsztyn territory. These two anniversaries, the most momentous occasions in the life of the nation, are like a clasp linking the nation's history with the present. In implementing a decision of the government Presidium concerning the management of the Grunwald fields and trails, we want to make use of Grunwald's history and the victory over Hitler's fascism to a much greater extent than before to teach society, especially the young generation of Poles, a lesson in civics and patriotism.

In accordance with a resolution of the executive board of the PZPR KW [Voivodship Committee], once a year local party echelons will evaluate civil defense undertakings in a given territory. Bu this we understand that civil defense questions in Olsztyn Voivodship are given a high priority. The timetable for the implementation of the resolutions of the Eight PZPR Congress which was developed and put into operation, and then made more specific and adapted to local conditions and needs, creates a foundation for the further strengthening of this important sphere of action of local organs of the state administration.

Krakow City Voivodship

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 1, Jan 81 pp 15-17

[Article by Eng Andrzej Zmuda, Vice President, City of Krakow]

[Text] Geographical conditions, industry and the urban agglomeration determine the tasks of civil defense in the Krakow Voivodship and OC organizational structure.

The relatively small area of the voivodship (3,254 km^2) is cut through by the Wisla and its numerous tributaries. The queen of Polish rivers, together with the Raba, which flows into it, is often the cause of flooding. Approximately 1.2 million inhabitants live in the voivodship, which encompasses 10 cities. The largest of these is Krakow (750,0-0 inhabitants), which is second in the country as a center of learning and culture and has a strong industrial base (particularly heavy industry and the electromachine industry). There are 284 production plants of various sizes and 830 institutions in the voivodship.

Civil defense forces here are considerable; they are organized according to our needs. All local OC units in cities and rural communes where rivers cause a po-

tential flood threat have antiflood services included in their structure and civil defense squads trained to carry out rescue operations in Krakow have been attached to groups of lifesaving units; the commanders of these groups are the deputy directors of quarters. In the event that a surprise attack is launched by a weapon of mass destruction and it is impossible to bring in the forces assigned to the rescue operation, substitute groupings are opened up. These are composed of the local OC units and the factory OC units from outside the area of Krakow. Commands of substitute groups are organized at a base of offices of selected cities and rural communes. These groups are trained by the civil defense chiefs of quarters, since the operational location of the substitute groups in time of need will be the town quarter. Such organization of civil defense forces guarantees that the tasks will be accomplished.

Both the representatives of the IOCK [Inspectorate of National Civil Defense], after conducting a comprehensive inspection of our OC program in 1979, and the directorship of the GORNA WISLA 80 exercises in April of last year gave an excellent evaluation of our training program and of the effectiveness of the civil defense forces of our voivodship. They recognized our center for the analysis of contamination and our communications system serving the needs of the voivodship center of universal warning and alert as model programs. They emphasized our particular achievements in developing civil defense plans and in the training of OC forces.

The training of civil defense officials in our voivodship is implemented in a systematic way.

The directorial cadre--directors of departments of the Office of Krakow City, directors of associations, managers and secretaries of city-rural commune offices and rural commune offices are trained in garrisons during 3-4 day courses once yearly. These courses are organized by the secretariat of the WKO [Voivodship Defense Committee]. Half of the material of the sessions is devoted to civil defense.

In addition to the theoretical sessions, the directorial cadre participates in comprehensive leadership staff exercises and war games. We have adopted the principle that the director (manager) should participate in and make a report on the voivodship exercises. His absence is justified only due to illness. As he prepares himself for these exercises, the director involves the whole department (or office) in the effort.

The directors of large factories also partake in the implementation of various subjects in these sessions. The president or vice president of Krakow is present for the reading of proposals and reports.

After completing basic training, those in departments of the voivodship office, employees of associations under the president of Krakow, employees of city-rural commune offices and employees of rural commune offices participate every 2 years in leadership staff exercises of the administrative unit at the basic level, and also undergo brushup training once every 5 years. Employees in charge of civil defense matters in offices are trained twice yearly. They also take active part in developing, preparing and conducting exercises for the rural commune. The directorship of all institutions and factories operating on the administrative territory of the rural commune participates in the exercises.

We attach great significance to the exercises performed by rural commune OC forces. They are prepared under the supervision of employees of the WIOC [Voivodship Inspectorate for Civil Defense] and selected employees of other departments of the voivodship office. Each year, one-fourth of the units at the basic level are involved in these exercises. In order to guarantee the presence of the proper number of WIOC employees at each of these exercises, they are simultaneously conducted in two, and at the most three rural communes. During these exercises, demonstrations of practical activities of selected local services of the civil defense force take place. Most often they are demonstrations of rescue activity, the display of a distribution point, how to safeguard a farm (a cattle-raising farm) against radioactive fallout and the operation of veterinary stations. At the end of the exercise a film is shown about the subject of civil defense. Village administrators also participate in the leadership staff portion of the exercises and submit reports concerning the implementation of their own tasks.

The training of OC units is based on courses which are organized at the voivodship level. The directors of units, deputy directors, chiefs of services, staff of observation points for contamination and nuclear explosions and the personnel of alert posts and stations participate in the training sessions.

The training of members of the OC unit takes place on the basis of programs employed at the rural commune level.

WIOC employees and employees engaged in work with civil defense matters in departments and in associations make up the training group of the WIOC chief. Together with them he organizes brushup sessions, leadership staff exercises, training sessions and ideological training, as well as amassing information concerning new normative-legal documents.

Instructional-methodological sessions are conducted for the instructional cadre for 2 days, twice annually. These sessions are held for the purpose of improving instructors, for offering them direction in their work and to check their knowledge by testing.

Our greatest difficulties lie in training those people who are not employed, i.e., in the absenteeism of these people. Consequently, a number of tasks for the purpose of making people aware of the need and usefulness of training are being undertaken. For example, in cinema theaters in Krakow City Voivodship, civil defense films are shown before each feature film presentation.

The training system which we have adopted and the methods which we have applied produce favorable results. This is why we have proposed continuing this system in the coming years.

The comprehensive exercises and cooperation with other organizations to overcome natural disasters have demonstrated that the OC officials and forces in our voivodship are well prepared to fulfill their tasks.

During the period 1977-1979, civil defense units completed socially useful projects for worth 82 million zlotys. This represents many kilometers of roads and telephone connections, many sports fields, recreational courts, parking lots and the like. It should be emphasized that Krakow hospitals and the Center for Child Health have received gifts of hundred of pints of blood from the members of our OC units.

All of this considerably increases the prestige of civil defense and the recognition given to it by society. Particularly today, when every sensible and useful endeavor is heavily counted on.

Bialystok Voivodship

Warsaw PRZEGLAD OBRONY CYWILNEJ in Polish No 2 Feb 81 pp 16-18

[Article by Zygmunt Sprycha, governor of Bialystok and chief of Voivodship Civil Defense]

[Text] The Bialystok Voivodship has a definite level of importance, both from the political-economical viewpoint and from the viewpoint of civil defense. On an area of 10,055 km^2, representing 3.1 percent of the area of the country live approximately 630,000 people, which is 1.8 percent of the total population of the Polish People's Republic.

In the past 36 years, tremendous economic and social changes have occurred in Bialystok Voivodship. A highly disregarded region during the interwar period, devastated and left to ruin during the occupation, the Bialystok region has energetically compensated for its many years of lagging. It has developed its industry, particularly its textile, food and timber industries. The capital of the region, Bialystok, is a modern center of science, education and culture of Bialystok Voivodship and neighboring voivodships. For years, institutions of higher learning have been in operation here and key local industrial plants have expanded. The socioeconomic character and geographical situation of the region affect the state of organization and preparations for civil defense in our voivodship.

Having gained some perspective on civil defense in our voivodship over the last several years, we have discovered that OC tasks were implemented with the social and economic needs of our region in mind. The reform of local organs of the state administration in 1975 gave rise to the necessity of adapting organizational structures to new conditions of operation. A provincial and urban inspectorate for OC was appointed, permanent positions for OC work were created in seven cities and in the remaining administrative units OC tasks have been executed by employees designated by the heads of these units.

The appointment of OC inspectorates facilitated directing the implementation of undertakings and contributed to significant progress in the development and improvement of civil defense. the WIOC and MIOC today are organs which, conceptually and comprehensively, take in the whole makeup of OC questions, while the particular departments of local units are responsible for OC matters issuing from the specifics of their operation.

In its first stage of operation, the WIOC [Voivodship Inspectorate of Civil Defense] undertook to prepare normative planning documents which were and continue to be the basis of action in organs and forces of OC in the voivodship. In order to standardize the plans of the local organs of the state administration, a model plan for the Tykocin rural commune was developed and all administrative units were familiarized with the plan. This standardized and considerably facilitated the development of OC plans by these units.

On the basis of the experience gained in exercises and training, we have developed a new organizational structure of city-rural commune OC forces. We have departed from the creation of local self-defense units comprised of hundreds of persons, substituting the appointment of TOOC [Territorial Civil Defense Units] numbering 150-200 persons, with local self-defense groups issuing from village administrators' offices. Local OC commands have likewise been appointed in all city-rural commune and rural commune offices. Due to these changes in organizational structures we have achieved the following results:

--the TOOC has become a maneuver-type unit made up of people inhabiting the locale that is the seat of rural commune offices;

--the TGS [Territorial GMINA?], which encompasses the operations of 2-3 village administrator's offices, unites within its ranks the people inhabiting a given locality. Consequently, these are people who are directly interested in protecting their own property. It should be pointed out here that the nature of the TGS is different in that it provides services indispensable for protecting the property and lives of inhabitants;

--the local OC command, which is appointed primarily from among the employees of city-rural commune offices, fulfills the function of a staff for the city-rural commune OC chief.

Such a solution has simplified directing the implementation of OC undertakings. During the 5 years that this program has been in operation we have developed principles for the functioning of these OC organs. In order to guarantee the suitable preparation of OC, OC training and brushup training are systematically conducted in all local organs of the state administration, in organs of the national economy, schools, places of work and living quarters. The primary goal of the training of OC forces is to prepare administrative and economic organs, the civilian forces of OC units, the school-age youth and students of higher learning, as well as all of society for effective protection and defense against the consequences of an attack of a weapon of mass destruction. The most universally used form of training the directorial cadre of OC is in the form of courses organized by the WIOC. The commanders of rescue forces, managers of cities and rural communes, secretaries of urban and rural commune offices, instructors of OC, chiefs of services and leaders of squads and sections of OC units train at these courses. Moreover, the directorial cadre of OC at all levels systematically undergoes self-improvement training via training sessions, groups exercises and demonstrations.

In summary--over 1,000 persons in the directorial cadre of OC organs and forces have undergone training. This year we plan to begin training the commanders of local OC groups.

In addition to training organized by the WIOC, we place great emphasis upon improving OC forces in training organized by OC chiefs of cities and rural communes. One hundred percent of the local and factory OC units undergo such training.

During the last 5-year period, two voivodship exercises were conducted in the Bialystok Voivodship: ESKULAP-77 and JESIEN-78. They differed from former exercises in many regards, since they approached a series of new problems. One of the most important of these was the dispersal of the population of Bialystok, particularly the population of group II. This problem was played out practically and theoretically in the

JESIEN-78 exercise. If the dispersal of groups I and II arouse no particular reservations, the problem of the dispersal of group III must still be considered and given closer study.

We have attempted experimental solutions for dealing with the dispersal of the population. In order to simplify tasks and shorten the dispersal time, we have bypassed the records-informational point and the point of disembarkation, the rural commune. Instead, the people have been directly taken to embarkation points, and from there transferred directly to the place they will be staying. In our opinion this is a very feasible solution.

Last year we printed 230,000 dispersal cards. These cards were filled out and have been filed. Factories keep them for their employees and districts of home utilization and housing cooperatives keep them for those who are not employed.

Lists of quarters assigned to accept dispersed people have been drawn up in cities and rural communes. At the present time, 100 percent of all factories, in an agreement with the rural communes, have allocated quarters and have set about informing their employees where they will be quartered.

The organization of communications is an immeasurably important element for ensuring a system of direction and management. In 1979, the expansion of the voivodship system of radiotelephone communications was completed. At the present time, in all offices of cities and rural communes, radiotelephones are operative, enabling us to reduce the flow of information and streamline direction and management. The system of radiotelephone communicatons passed the test not only during exercises, but also in practical use during the period of the hard winter of 1978-1979 as well as in antiflood actions. Radiotelephone communications likewise enable us to improve our system of universal warning and alert and the flow of information in our system for detecting contamination.

Civil defense popularization and propaganda, its goals and tasks, is a question to which we devote much attention in our everyday activities. In 1976, the WIOC organized a permanent display of publications which popularize the goals and tasks of OC. School-age youth, students of institutions of higher learning, factory employees and the local populace visit this display. We also make wide use of the local and factory press, as well as urban and factory radio networks.

For the 30th anniversary year of OC, we are planning to organize a traveling exhibit. This will be taken to all administrative units of our voivodship. In honor of the anniversary, lectures will be organized, their material enriched by a demonstration of the practical work of OC forces, of the ways to make use of individual means of protection against contamination and of protection of food, water and fodder.

Last year, in order to lend civil defense its proper place, the urban committees, urban-rural commune committees and rural commune committees of the PZPR undertook the initiative to investigate OC matters at meetings of the executive boards.

Another aspect of OC propaganda and popularization is the coming into contact of lecturers with the populace of the voivodship during anniversary celebrations. The LOK-KOR [National Defense League-Social Self-Defense Committee] the TWO [Society for Defense Knowledge] and other social organizations have made significant progress in

in this field. We are also developing visual propaganda on the territory of cities-rural communes and on the premises of factories.

A very basic problem is that of the supply of technical-military equipment. Such civil defense equipment necessitates the proper storage conditions at all echelons of the voivodship. We are systematically modernizing and expanding our storage base. This year in Bialystok, the construction and putting to use of new storehouses for equipment at the disposal of the WIOC and MIOC [Urban Inspectorate for Civil Defense] have been implemented.

One of the most valuable initiatives--the showing of films and slides on OC subjects in cinema theaters and in mobile cinemas throughout the voivodship--has been in operation since 1977.

Competitions between factories and local units is both a form of popularization and a way to improve OC forces and their organizational structures. The review of the results of such competition and the casual exchange of experiences enable us to eliminate many blunders and to rectify organizational, planning and training shortcomings.

Practice shows that the work of OC units, and their achievements depend in large part on the direct interest of the directors of factories and administrative units. OC rivalry in local administrative units, together with factory rivalry, has a significant effect on the general results attained by these units, and the directors of these units aspire to the improvement of OC within their domain.

The results attained in OC activity create favorable conditions for the implementation of tasks laid out for the coming years. As civil defense chief of the voivodship, I am convinced that we will completely fulfill the tasks issuing from the law concerning the universal obligation to defend the Polish People's Republic and the order of the national OC chief concerning the implementation of OC tasks, and that our OC organs and forces will bring new, genuine, concrete gains to the national economy.

Enriched by our experiences, we will continue to improve the defense capacility of our voivodship.

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WERBLAN ARTICLE ON LIMITS OF AUTHORITY DISPUTE NOTED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 12, 21 Mar 81 pp 1, 15

[Article by Andrzej Werblan, PZPR secretary and chairman of the Editorial Committee of NOWI DROGI: "Dispute About the Limits of Authority"; portions within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] Twenty-three years ago, I published in the first issue of POLITYKA an article entitled "Dispute About the Limits of Political Freedom." After having reread it, I would support the essential points and omit the part about exemplification, which has lost its meaning. The experience of time passed and the consideration framed by my own political activity lead me to conclude, however, that burdensome thoughts prevailing at that time were a definite imperfection. The question regarding limits on political freedom is one side of the coin. The limits of authority decide the other side. Between both questions comes the interdependence that reminds one of feedback. It is precisely to this second question, the limits of authority in a democratic-socialist society, that I wish to devote the following thoughts.

This issue is tied with the problem of the legal validity of authority, or its legitimacy, which has been discussed recently in many publications. The British political scientist, Paul G. Lewis, defines legitimacy as the political conditions by which those in authority can educe the right to have authority from premises other than the mere fact of having authority. Theoretically, two premises can come into play; i.e., the first being the origin of authority and the second being the results achieved from it for the public good.

I

At the end of World War II, a revolutionary change in the social, economic and political system was carried out in our country. The factor of strength played a considerable role in the origin and the course of the change. From this background, a discussion continually revives on the legal validity of authority that has developed up to now in our country.

I had the opportunity to acquaint myself with a tape recording of one such discussion. It was public, so by recalling it, I am not being indiscrete. Beginning that discussion, Adam Michnik perceived the causes of the political crises in Poland matter of factly, as he stated:

"The origin of People's Poland lies beyond Poland. It lies in the decisions made at the Yalta Conference and also in the course of military actions during World War II. At the Yalta Conference, the three large allies--Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union--divided the world into zones of influence. As a result of that division, Poland found herself in the Soviet zone of influence.... Thus, the structural continuity of the Second Republic was broken, and the government supported and inspired by the Soviet Union, whose fundamental and leading element was the Polish Workers' Party [PPR], assumed actual authority."

Developing his idea, the author states further, among others:

"At the same time, the Polish Socialist Party [PPS] was called to life, into whose composition came persons who were simply communist agents or persons who had been sent during the war to prison camps in the Soviet Union where they were 'persuaded' to create a new, reborn and progressive PPS."

A far-reaching simplification and a great liberty in manipulating facts is contained in his entire argumentation.

Before I proceed with a discussion of the fundamental question, I cannot as a former activist in the "licensed" PPS, side with views set forth by the party. I recall only that prominent figures in the leadership of the reborn PPS were activists from the leftwing of the socialist movement during the Occupation, primarily the Polish Workers' Socialist Party (RPPS), including, among others, Edward Osobka-Morawski, Stanislaw Szwalbe, Henryk Wachowicz and Feliks Baranowski, and also activists involved initially with Freedom, Equality, Independence [WRN], and later prisoners from Nazi concentration camps like Jozef Cyrankiewicz and Kazimierz Rusinek. POW Adam Rapacki, emigrant to Great Britain Julian Hochfeld, and Oscar Lange and Henryk Jablonski, activists during the war in the United States and France, respectively, also should be mentioned. Among PPS members who returned from emigration in the Soviet Union, Boleslaw Drobner and Stefan Matuszewski played a more outstanding role in the reborn PPS, placing themselves after all on opposite political extremes. That is too fragile a basis for the philosophy-of-history hypothesis spun by Adam Michnik on the subject of the PPS.

Let us return, however, to the heart of the matter. It is true that the leftwing camp, which took power in Poland in 1944, did not have the support of the majority of the people, although its social influences beginning in 1943 grew constantly in relation to the general radicalization of public feelings. Having taken power, the left fought for public support through use of political means as well, simultaneously aiding forces in the government and sympathetic international cadres. In referenda and elections, the opposition Polish Peasants' Party [PSL] conducted agitation, controlled the press, political organization and so forth, but it did not find itself on an equal footing. The PSL was harmed in various ways by difficulties placed in its path by state authorities. For the sake of truth, it should be remembered that the bloc of democratic parties; i.e., the coalition composed of the PPR, the PPS, the PSL and the Democratic Party [PSD], was overcome not only through use of agitation and the ballot, but also through use of firearms. A civil war, in which the governing camp suffered losses twice as high as those of the opposition, took place in many areas of the country. Those are dramatic pages of history. Poles perished on both sides.

On the whole, therefore, those losses burdened the nation and were the price that had to be paid for a place in the sun and the choice of development. Only persons divested of imagination and a sense of responsibility would consciously subject their nation once again to the danger of that type of conflict and to the tragedy that comes with it.

Abstractly in point of fact, one can consider the hypothesis that public sympathy, at least as it developed in 1944 or 1945, could have brought the London camp to power. This hypothesis leads to the question, however, whether it was possible and in Poland's best interests. If it were possible, then the London camp itself ruled it out by resigning from the consultation policy with the Soviet Union begun by Gen Wladyslaw Sikorski and thereafter adopting a hostile position toward it. During the war, formation of a government on the eastern front was ruled out because the government was openly supporting the rupture of the anti-Nazi coalition. Such a government also could not count on the support of its Western allies.

On the other hand, concerning Poland's interests, it is obvious to every person who understands politics and is oriented to historical reality that the assumption of authority by the London camp and preservation of the capitalist system would have threatened Poland with a reduction of her territory to that between the Bug River and the prewar western boundary, with the possibility of a shift toward the west in Upper Silesia and Silesian Opole, as well as in the area of Eastern Prussia. Great Britain and the United States recognized the Curzon Line as the Soviet Union's western boundary at the Tehran Conference. This was not only understood in light of the Soviet Union's contribution during the war and her security requirements, but also justified from the viewpoint of ethnic considerations. In contrast, the Western allies were reluctant to the idea of returning Poland to the Piast lands; i.e., up to the line at the Odra and Nysa Luzycka rivers. Consideration for future relations with Germany came into play here. It is known that Stalin also vacillated on this question. He realized that declaring himself in favor of Polish claims would immediately involve him in a conflict with the Western allies and in terms of historical perspectives possibly presage a prolonged conflict with Germany.

Having a choice between Poland and Germany, the Soviet Union chose Poland. Not only consideration for Soviet state interests, which demanded a weakening of Germany's base to attack the East, was predominant behind this choice. Revolutionary changes in Poland and the prospect for the country's socialist development played at least an equivalent role. These actions authenticated the permanence of the Polish-Soviet alliance thanks to a minimalization or an elimination of political and ideological discrepancies between both countries.

In other words, leftwing authority lies in the Polish nation's vital interests. The favorable shape of the state's territory, the assurance of security and the basis of economic development depend on leftwing authority. It is possible to demonstrate that fundamental social reforms were a condition required for rapid industrialization, urbanization, revolution in the educational and cultural spheres, full employment and thus advancement of civilization. Capitalist Poland could not avoid chronic unemployment, tremendous social spread and other structural weaknesses related to capitalism, all the more because capitalism here would have been relatively backward.

Recessions, breakdowns, mistakes and all other shortcomings during the last three decades have not shaken this thesis. The truth is that if those shortcomings had not existed (which is rather hard to assume) or if there had been much fewer of them (which lies within the realm of possibility), then the progress achieved by Poland would have been considerably greater and the foundations for legitimacy of people's authority stronger, thanks to results achieved by it. We shall return later to this question.

For the time being, let us limit ourselves to the ascertainment that although in the beginning the people's authority was a minority authority, it achieved relatively rapidly through realization of the nation's fundamental interests a degree of public recognition that was sufficient to cause the organized opposition to it to decline and later to have the majority of the nation participate in the realization of the program outlined by the authority. The atmosphere of work resulting from instinctive aims to offset extreme loss of life during the war, to take the opportunity to industrialize and to promote the advancement of society, civilization and culture also played a not insignificant role here.

II

In the course of 35 years, public recognition of people's authority has formed in a variety of ways. After the October Events of 1956, Wladyslaw Gomulka enjoyed outright unconditional support. Although there were characteristics of a plebiscite, the January 1957 elections were undoubtedly authentic in their result. A high degree of spontaneous behavior and great freedom of political expression characterized the situation at the time. The fact that the greater part of society was willing to listen to Wladyslaw Gomulka's appeals resulted in the acceptance of his arguments.

A similar occurrence was apparent for some length of time after the December Events of 1970. The "new" leadership at the time aroused an extraordinarily large amount of enthusiasm and trust, if one weighs the obvious simplifications in its declarations and policies, in which the seeds of later collapse were contained. Initial approval of the post-December policies is a psychological and social phenomenon that requires greater research. It can be explained only partially by an "aftershock" reaction to the December Events, in particular because it also embraced the educated strata of society and political and intellectual circles, all of which are usually quite skeptical. The applause and dithyrambs at the time could have gone to the heads of considerably more intelligent people than those who were lauded with praise.

In some measure, eruptions of criticism during the years of collapse and crisis were the reversal of periods of admiration. Nevertheless, monotony predominated. For years, public opinion was skeptical, but passive, and propaganda was less than effective in inspiring the people's moods. The weakness of a widely outlined environment of authority--I am also thinking self-critically--relied on an uncommonly easy reconciliation with the "normal" state of affairs and on an appeasement through illusions, when much was foretold about an imminent crisis, but still it was possible to look for solutions to avoid losses and upheavals.

First, /an effort was never undertaken to strengthen the genetic foundations of legitimizing authority, that is to democratize the systems that appoint the governing groups in the party and the government/ and to open the way to autonomy in various fields of public life. It seems this can be achieved in full within the framework of the existing political system. It is not true that electoral democracy and public autonomy join inseparably with political pluralism.

Second, /the issue of legitimizing authority through results of its actions has also been underestimated/. The meaning of the realization of the nation's historical interests during the advent of People's Poland has been overrated, proclaiming after all the unquestionable and authentic prerequisite for authority's legal validity. It has been forgotten, however, that in the course of time authority requires regular replenishment through the effective realization of current and topical interests.

The 1970's brought a risky attempt to strengthen the position of authority in society through securing spectacular results in the field of economic growth and raising the standard of living. Against a background of stagnation from the 1960's, the need was obvious and the intention commendable. However, it was carried out in a manner that brought opposite results from those envisioned.

Third, /efforts toward the authentication of political alliances and their expansion, especially in the direction of those without party affiliation and catholics, were unsatisfactory and in every case incommensurate to needs/. Of course, we cannot underestimate that which was done in this matter. Comparatively, the achieved model of state coexistence with the [Catholic] Church constitutes the precious possession of People's Poland. The 1970's also saw an improvement in this area. Despite the glaring mistakes of agricultural policy, the specific characteristics of the Polish countryside and the traditions of private farming also were respected. During the 1960's, much was done to overcome remnants of former political differences from World War II and the fight for authority, whose visible sign became an atmosphere of reconciliation in a combatant's environment. Literally, the conceived authority, however, was based continually on comparatively narrow circles and the chances for persons without party affiliation to obtain positions in public life despite genuine qualifications were uneven.

Fourth, /not only on higher levels of the political structure, but also generally in the [Communist] Party and in allied political parties, these aspects were almost never discussed, and so no one was informed properly about the actual state of affairs with regard to the public basis of authority/. Negative phenomena in this area were noted too late or one simply closed his eyes to them. All of this led to a paradoxical situation. Weakening public support restricted the limits of possibility for authority, which consequently should have led to caution and resignation from the difficult intention to gain approval. In this case, the opposite occurred. Precisely during periods when public recognition weakened, the actions of authority took on the appearance of self-confidence and voluntarism, both in propaganda and in political and economic decisions.

This phenomenon was repeated with astounding regularity. Let us recall the beginning of the 1950's. A return of terror ensued at the time, as if there had

not been enough people killed during the civil war. In spite of the logic of a stabilizing political situation and a considerable commitment on the part of society to the industrialization program, widely planned and preposterous repression fell upon members of the AK [Home Army], PPS, peasant groups, the suspected and actual opposition and also some activists of the PPR. This took place in defiance of the law, frequently by erasing previous amnesties. It is also possible to cite an example of such inconsistent-with-logic policy from another field and period; i.e., when deterioration of conditions for industrial and urban expansion occurred during the middle of the 1970's, management of the economy responded by intensifying the expansion. As a result, widespread areas of backwardness of social and political relations with respect to mature possibilities and needs of a socialist society came into being. Today, the resulting contradictions and tensions are discharged violently and impulsively. The permanence of changes depend, however, on appropriate structural reforms of which a picture gradually emerges from discussions taking place before the Ninth PZPR Congress, but over which a long battle will yet ensue.

III

One of the journalists recently pointed out accurately that when authority extends its will to govern beyond the area it is capable of controlling, then confusion and anarchy inevitably creep into the entire state system.

Law should delineate the limits of authority from a formal point of view and from a political point of view, with regard to public support and governmental effectiveness.

Regarding the legal state, postrevolutionary systems slowly take shape only within the framework of compact legal systems and full respect for the law. This is understood. Revolution overthrows the legal order existing at the time and is guided by the principle "one's own law confers title." The institutionalization of revolutionary arrangements through law only comes later. The simplified preeminence of politics over law remains for a long time, however, and only with difficulty does understanding find its way, in that the social and class sense of law is expressed chiefly through the influence of the classes fulfilling authority in the making of law and its content, and not through direct guidance by concrete application of law. It seems that a new step forward in the development of law and order in our conditions at present requires acceptance of the assumption that the social system is better and more efficiently served by law, especially in that its application and observance are realized automatically and independently.

As I have discussed this issue in other articles, the solution also requires the identification of constitutional and actual centers of authority. Above all, the governing party's administrative stages must guide the state not so much through the intervention of administrative organs, but rather through activity in representative organs.

Difficulties with the clear arrangement of the mutual relationship between the state's political and economic functions have a chronic character. As a result,

the risk of mistakes in economic policy, which prompted conflicts taking on a political character, grew out of far-reaching identification of the economy's management with the center of political decisionmaking. Currently, this issue is being widely discussed, and sensible reforms promising its resolution through consistent division of the state's political and economic functions are being outlined.

All factors demarcating the limits of authority--law, public recognition and effectiveness--are joined with political democracy. Forces fighting over authority, and leftwing movements are also included here, are inclined to consider the points of political democracy primarily in terms of simplification or as impediments to the realization of their goals. This one-sidedness in understanding democracy continually weighs on our political thinking. However, the fact is that /the party discharging authority should consider political democracy chiefly in other terms; i.e., as the most suitable, and maybe even the only, effective method available to optimize decisions, to verify public support and to form or to change leadership groups in a timely manner and without excessive upheavals/. In this framework, political democracy constitutes the factor of efficacy for discharging authority and also the foundation for its influence and the premise for social discipline. In such a way, I would also interpret Stanislaw Kania's well-known words: "Democracy is not a gesture of authority, but rather a mature need of socialism."

The problem concerning the mechanics of political democracy in our conditions has many aspects. I shall limit myself to the issue of intraparty democracy, which has a key significance for democracy in our entire political life.

The fundamental duty of the governing party, superior to any others, boils down to the formation of good governing teams. If that duty is not fulfilled, then all else loses meaning. /The governing party proves itself not through removal of bad governments--society is capable of doing that as a last resort--but through skill in offering the right teams/. This in effect is more important or even primary as regards the program, because the outline of an appropriate program can be recognized as a duty of the governing group, and even as a gauge of the level represented by the group.

An analysis of the proposition with respect to the question of intraparty democracy leads to interesting conclusions that have come during the last crucial months from basic party organizations. They appreciate in full the fundamental aspect of democracy, which is control over the appointment of management, and postulate as far as possible the democratization of elections and limitation on the length of time one can hold managerial functions. The universality of these postulates stirs optimism as to the permanence and the institutionalization of democratic changes.

Mistrust of hitherto existing electoral systems has gone to extremes. For example, an almost universal demand is that conferences and congresses directly elect first secretaries of the individual provincial committees and even the first secretary of the Central Committee. This ensues from justified mistrust toward [party] echelons gained by experience, and for that reason the postulate may gain approval despite the fact that democratic tradition gives ascendancy to intermediate electors.

As a consequence of this, however, predominance of the first secretaries over governing echelons will be increased. For the time being, this does not awaken broader fears, chiefly, I feel, because of the notion that if the "masses" were to elect directly a popular and trusted leader, then those issues would take care of themselves.

In the first part of this article, I called to mind that both previous leaders of our party initially enjoyed great popularity. It is worth posing the question as to which direction did the ensuing authority go; also, the removal of potential opponents and the silencing in a different way of thinking and "standardized" views. This maybe results from a natural human inclination, but it leads to the creation of a make-believe and sterile unity. Thus, we have reached the key issue: /it is impossible for the party to protect itself from deformations, limitations of democracy and voluntarism without limiting the possibility of eliminating those who think differently, even if they are in the minority/. I am not referring to the party's defense of the right to veto nor to agreement for obstruction of effective actions by the minority. I am referring to the protection of critical and skeptical thinking and to protection of signaling arrangements that are capable of warning against danger.

The indispensable factor of proper relations in this area also determines the publicness of party life and restraint in interfering through the aid of so-called organizational means in a divergence of opinion on ideological character. This does not contradict the principles of democratic centralism, if those principles are understood in a Leninist rather than a bureaucratic sense. Lenin, author of the concept of democratic centralism and the resolute spokesman of political discipline in the party, simultaneously attached enormous weight to freedom of discussion and expression of views within the party. It was unheard of in his time to decide on important issues without actual discussion, which is to say, arbitrarily.

Of course, we should not set in concrete the definition of political democracy. It constitutes only one, albeit an extremely important one, condition of correct policy. As with everything in public life, democracy is also deceptive. One-sided pressure on democracy can lead to a weakening of the ability and the efficiency of collective action to atomize society. /The fundamental question is to find the optimal connection of democracy with discipline./ This demands acceptance of the assumption that social discipline and the ability to organize collective action are not in conflict with democracy, but are rather an integral consequence of it. For these reasons, we have a lot to make up for both in political thought and in practice. During the course of the last three centuries, the tradition of state employment in our country has not been rich. State functions have grown rapidly in People's Poland, but this has not advanced the quality of state work. We have too frequently understood and practiced democratic centralism from the view of a one-sided accent on discipline and the subordination to superior authority, and democracy has led us astray at various times into an absence of authority. This is the truth. However, we cannot throw the baby out with the bath water. Today, when attention is concentrated on democracy and autonomy, and institutions and state cadres find themselves censored, it should be stubbornly remembered that democracy maintains its sense and also its forming and healing properties only if it frees the capability of competent and disciplined action and helps to build and to respect the influence of public institutions. This depends on society and authority together.

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REPORT ON MILITARY ACADEMY SESSION ON HISTORY OF MILITARY ART

Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTORIE in Romanian Mar 81 pp 530-535

[Article by Dan A. Lazarescu: "The Military Academy's 18th Session of Scientific Papers--the Section on the History of the Art of War"]

[Text] The 18th session of scientific papers at the Military Academy took place on 18-19 November 1980.

The plenary session took place on Tuesday, 18 November 1980, there being seated in the presidium: Mihnea Gheorghiu, the chairman of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences, Army Gen Ion Tutoveanu, the commandant of the Military Academy, Prof Dr Stefan Stefanescu, the director of the "Nicolae Iorga" Institute of History, generals and senior officers.

The opening address was given by Army Gen Ion Tutoveanu, the commandant of the Military Academy, who presented the general subject matter of the 18th session and the breakdown of this subject matter according to the various sections into which the session was to be divided.

Also in the plenary session, four substantial papers were then presented, namely: "The War of the Whole Populace for Defending the Homeland--a Component of Interwar Romanian Military Thought," by Col Dr Gheorghe Tudor; "The Changes Made in the Structure and Training of the Active Population and Their Implications for the Strengthening of the Defensive Capacity of the Population," by Col Dr Mircea Grosu and Col Gh. Niculescu; "The Cooperation of the Forces Participating in the Armed Struggle in the War of the Whole Populace," by Lt Gen Gheorghe Logofatu and Col Dr (ret) Bogdan Stanescu; "The Character of the Interaction Between Science, Technology and the Military Field, Under the Present Conditions," by Maj Gen Dr Engr Ioan Angheloiu.

After these papers, the division of the session into many sections took place.

The third section, in which the proceedings devoted to the history of the art of war took place, had a presidium headed by Col Dr Victor Atanasiu, as chairman, Col Dr Leonida Loghin, Col Anton Marinescu, Dr Paul Cernovodeanu and Dan A. Lazarescu. The extensive program put together for this section included papers on polemology, military policy and training, military functionality and military history.

The first paper was given by Capt Dan Mircea Capatina, who, on the basis of the extensive and so fruitful excavation work that he is doing on a team at the site of the medieval city of Giurgiu, presented the extremely interesting findings and the extremely pertinent conclusions that are being brought out on the basis of the latest results of these excavations.

In essence, the city of Giurgiu was built, at the command of Mircea the Old, in the southwestern part of the present city, at the confluence of the Veriga River and the channel of the Cama, on a former island located about 100 meters from the Romanian shore. The first documentary reference to the city of Giurgiu dates from 23 September 1403, but the construction of the city very probably began before 1396. In 1417, the Turks took the city in battle, naming it Yer Koku. Dan II reconquered it in 1427 and rebuilt its fortifications, but Alexandru Aldea gave it back to the Turks. The speaker later gave data about the crusade-expedition made in the summer of 1445 against Giurgiu--following the Varna crusade in 1444--and the action of Michael the Brave against Giurgiu in 1595. Later, the digging plan and the history of the current archeological research were presented by means of slides.

Dr Paul Cernovodeanu, a chief researcher at the "Nicolae Iorga" Institute of History, developed a quite little known subject of military history, namely "Romanian Military Missions Sent Abroad During the Reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza." The Romanian patriots who had carried to a happy conclusion the action for the unity and autonomy of the Romanian principalities were always aware of the indispensable necessity of organizing a "national army"--as Machiavelli had proposed in "Il Principe"--capable of defending the great political achievements obtained and put--formally--under the guarantee of the seven powers in 1856. Since, of these guarantor powers, Napoleon III's France was the power that played the main role in the foreign defense of the bold initiatives of the Romanian patriots, it was as natural as could be for the Romanian military missions to seek models of military higher education and technology in the great military institutions of the Second Empire (at the staff school in Paris, at the cavalry school in Saumur, at the technical schools in Saint Cyr, Metz, Brest and Vincennes). Since Italy, too, had played a significant role in European diplomacy, in the sense of defending the Romanian political achievements, the military schools of the new united kingdom of Italy, too, were attended by a large number of Romanian officers, while other Romanian officers were completing their training at the military schools in Vienna and Petersburg. Romanian military missions were sent to be trained during military operations throughout the world: in the theater of war between Spain and Morocco; in Algeria; during the operations undertaken by the army of the Italian kingdom to oust the monarchy of the Bourbons from the kingdom of the Two Sicilies; in Mexico, where there had begun the start of what a recent historian called "la grande pensee du regne de Napoleon III," but which failed once it took on the brutal aspect of a true colonial war; finally, in the Civil War. Many Romanian officers sent on these remote missions were later to say much about them, either as authors of military works (George Bibescu, Eustatiu Poncovici, Ion Algiu) or as heroes and capable commanders in the Plevna campaign (Maj Dimitrie Giurescu, colonels Gh. Slaniceanu, Gh. Anghelescu, D. Lecca, D. Boranescu, Maj C. Prunca and so on). The idea of sending the Romanian officers to all the theaters of war in the world, between 1860 and 1866, belonged to Prince Alexandru Ion Cuza and his military advisers, generals Ion Emanoil Florescu and Savel Manu. The results exceeded all expectations.

Lt Col Nicolae Ciobanu of the Military Academy described "Elements of the Romanian Art of War in a Work of Tactics and Strategy Prepared by Col Gheorghe Slanicoanu in 1874." It is a question of the printing of 25 lectures given by Romania's future minister of war toward the outbreak of the Russo-Romano-Turkish war, lectures in which--from a surprisingly modern viewpoint--the main problems of military strategy, tactics and psychology, including guerilla warfare, were dealt with.

"Some Aspects of Romanian Fortification" were described by Col Dr Nicolae I. Nicolae, who gave a brief history of the conditions in which the country's capital was fortified, in the second half of the past century, on the basis of plans of which the first was drawn up as early as 1882, along with other works of strategic defense (the line of the Danube, the line of the Olt, the bridgehead at Cernavoda and the Focsani-Namoloasa-Galati fortified front, 1887-1900). The fortification of the country's capital entailed a perimeter of 72 km, containing 18 forts and 18 intermediate batteries, located at a distance of 11-11.5 km from the center of the capital and provided with lines of communication for supply and aid. The report on the general fortification of the country was prepared by a military commission headed by Art Gen Gheorghe Manu, a future council chairman and one of the heroes of Plevna. Nevertheless, the fact that the works for fortifying the country's capital were not modernized caused the intended objective to not be achieved in 1916, with the artillery pieces being used on other battlefronts. The speaker judged this situation as being a strategic error, due to which the fate of the Romanian campaign in 1916 was compromised.

Col Dr Vasile Alexandrescu titled his paper "Contributions to the Study of Romania's Foreign Military Policy in the Last Decade of the 19th Century." It is a question of the act of balancing between the blocs of alliance formed by the great European powers soon after the Berlin Congress, especially after Chancellor Bismarck's removal from power (March 1980). Lacking the joint guarantee given to it through the Treaty of Paris (1856), Romania was obliged to conduct an extremely cautious foreign policy, securing, temporarily, new European protection for itself in 1883, that of the Triple Alliance, but understanding to keep unaltered its good relations with all the European states. This prudence in foreign policy induced Romania's political leadership to reject the insidious proposal of a secret military treaty between Turkey and Romania, a proposal transmitted, through Minister Trandafir Djuvara, by Sultan Abdul Hamid in the spring of 1897. The mission entrusted to Col Alexandru Averescu, sent in 1899 to Odessa and Kiev, is explained by means of this constant concern of the Romanian governments for maintaining their good relations with all the powers on the continent.

"Aspects of the Training of the Army and the Whole Populace for Defending the Homeland, in the View of the Romanian Doctrinaires, at the End of the 19th Century and the Start of the 20th Century" was the title of the paper by Col Dr Popa Costica, who dealt mainly with the attitude of the PSDMR /Social Democratic Workers Party of Romania/ toward the foreign policy, the military training and the structure of the Romanian army in the respective era. Some Romanian works of the era on strategy and tactics, by military instructors and commentators, such as Maj I. Popovici, Gen C. N. Hirjeu (the future minister of war in the Marghiloman government), Col D. Cocorascu and generals Gheorghe Anghelescu and C. I. Bratianu, were also analyzed.

Sr Lt Dan C. Radulescu presented a number of "Considerations Regarding the Evolution of the Romanian Army's Functions in the Third Decade of the 20th Century," bringing

out the unanimity of the Romanian commentators of the era in regarding as a chief function of the Romanian army the function of defending the homeland's territory. Frequently, however, economic functions, ones of rebuilding the country, ones of public works and so on were also given to the army. But the Romanian army always understood to remain, above all, "an organism attached to the ideal of completely preserving the national independence, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Romania."

On the basis of research done recently in foreign archives, Col Anton Marinescu described "Matters Referring to Our Country's History in the Archives of the FRG" (Coblentz, Frankfurt am Main, Freiburg, Bonn, Stuttgart and so on). The respective information concerns the whole historical past of the Romanian people, beginning with the Romanian population's presence confirmed incontestably in Transylvania at the start of the 13th century and ending with the reports of the German military attaches in Romania on the eve of and during World War II, culminating in SS Gen Pfeffer Wildenbruch's reports noting the heroic actions performed by the Romanian troops in the battle of Budapest (winter 1944/45).

Dan A. Lazarescu sketched a typology of the complex and subtle calculation that a state's political and military authorities must make before involving it in an offensive war. This calculation must put as correctly as possible in the equation a number of data, namely: the guiding and mobilizing idea; the moral, military, economic and material potential of the aggressor country, of its allies, of the direct enemies and of the potential enemies; the way in which the alliances work; and the propagandistic formulas capable of galvanizing its own energies and of breaking up, eventually, the moral coherence of the enemies. Applying this scheme to 12 recent wars (beginning with the Seven Years' War--1756-1763--and ending with the two world wars), it was found that in only 5 cases did the calculation of the aggressor power turn out to be correct in the end. It is a question of two wars waged by France (the war in 1778-1783 against England for securing the independence of the American colonies and the war in 1859 against Austria for the freedom and unity of Italy) and the three wars admirably direct by Bismarck (in 1864, 1866 and 1870). The other seven cases (including Napoleon's campaign in Russia in 1812, the last Russo-Turkish wars and the two world wars) demonstrated that the aggressor powers put in the equation some incorrect data and insufficient predictions, in addition to other data correctly weighted and integrated into the political and strategic calculation.

Dwelling mainly on World War I--regarded as immeasurably fuller of strategic, political and psychological lessons than the brutal World War II--the speaker stated that all of Bismarck's calculations and warnings bequeathed to his successors--the avoidance of a war with a big coalition and on too many fronts, the prohibition of a "prophylactic" (preventive) war, the avoidance of thoughtless provocation of Great Britain through an imprudent naval policy and through Weltpolitik and, lastly, the avoidance of the granting of the initiatives, in the Near East and the Balkans, to the ally in Vienna--were, absolutely all, despised and scorned by the political and military leaders of Wilhelm's Germany. These incorrect calculations regarding a number of elements--in addition to other elements very correctly put in the equation--explain Germany's final collapse in 1918.

Col Dr Victor Atanasiu presented and commented on "An Unpublished Document Referring to Russo-Romano-Serbian Relations in the Period of Romania's Neutrality (1914-1916)." Returning to a subject that he also presented, from another viewpoint, at the 15th

International Congress of Historical Sciences in Bucharest (August 1980), the speaker used a document unpublished until then, namely a page coming from the personal archives of Gen D. Iliescu, the former deputy chief of the joint chiefs of staff of the Romanian army between 1914-1916 and the main strategic figure in Romania's involvement in World War I. The document mentions a certain hypothesis, conventionally called "BV-4," and is accompanied by a very detailed map regarding the grouping of the Russo-Romanian operational armies that were to have acted against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to rescue Serbia. The map indicates precisely the Romanian railroads--with their extensions on the territory of Transylvania--that were to have been put at the disposal of the czarist armies, in two directions of advance, while five other directions of advance are indicated for the Romanian armies, so that the Dej-Cluj-Alba Iulia alignment of coordination would be attained on the 27th and 28th days after mobilization. The very transparent allusions made by the western press in 1915, especially by the well-known newspaperman Francis Charmes in the very influential REVUE DES DUEX MONDES, regarding a possible Russo-Romanian military action on Serbia's behalf thus responded to precise political and strategic plans of the Romanian government and the Romanian military leadership, plans that pursued--in the spirit of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest--the rescue of Serbia.

Sr Lt Vladimir Zodian described "The Battle of Marasesti, According to the German Documents of the Mackensen Army Group" and thus had the opportunity to analyze the illusions and disillusions of the higher war leadership of the Central Powers in the summer of 1917, a leadership that was pursuing incontestable expansionist, imperialist and annexationist goals. The achievement of the balance of power on the western front, through the withdrawal of the German front from France on a formidable line fortified with care, and the outbreak of the total submarine war on the Atlantic front were to occasion a decisive action for eliminating the enemy states from the eastern front.

This bold plan was ultimately carried out on a temporary basis, as a result of the events that led to the conclusion of the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. But, in the interim, the plan had many consequences unfavorable to the Central Powers: It caused the entry of the United States into the war; it made known to the whole world these militarized powers' wish for power and annexation; lastly, by means of the heroic defensive victory, unanticipated by the enemy, of the Romanian First Army at Marasesti, the Romanian soldiers put one of the most glorious pages in the golden book of Romania's bravery, interrupting the reputation for invincibility of the "breaker of fronts," as German Field Marshal August von Mackensen was nicknamed, and causing in that "annee trouble," as Raymond Poincare calls the war year 1917 in his "Memoirs," an unexpected turnabout, from which the Entente could have benefited better. The enemy's strategic plan was thus totally foiled and "in spite of it, there were able to remain on Moldavia's territory human fighting forces and capacities which kept a significant part of the troops of the Central Powers in a constant state of alert and which were capable of again entering the conflict, in the final phase of the world war."

"Romania's Foreign Military Relations in the July 1940-June 1941 Period" were analyzed by Col Dr Dumitru Tutu, in the context of the escalation of the conflict between the revisionist and antirevisionist powers in Europe. Achieving a double diplomatic and strategic blow at the end of August 1940, by means of the second Vienna Diktat, Germany, occasioning the territorial guarantee given to Romania after this diktat, tried to secure its military, economic and political domination over the

dictatorial Romanian state and Romania's adoption of the line of the German military policy, especially through an intricate action of the German military mission sent to Romania in October 1940 and through the forced adherence of the government of the military-fascist dictatorship to the Tripartite Pact on 23 November 1940. "Romania's alliance with the Axis Powers was thus dictated by the political and military circumstances of the times and not by the national interests of the Romanian people" is the conclusion of the well-known military historian.

"The Defense of the Borders in the Romanian Art of War" was the subject chosen--and treated very competently--by Col Vasile Pricop. The Romanian princes and the Romanian nobility in Transylvania and Banat always took care to provide for themselves in advance a flexible system for defending the country's borders and gaining information about the movements of the many possible enemies. After the assertion of Romania's autonomy in the second half of the last century, the country's political and military leadership endeavored to provide for the defense of the country's borders so that it would be possible to cope with any aggression. Obviously, the task was very difficult, given the exceptional length of the borders to defend and the possibly very high number of potential enemies. The Romanian military doctrine wavered, until our century, between two different strategic views regarding the strategy for defending the borders.

Monica Andone, a scientific researcher at the Center for Studies and Research in Military History and Theory, brought out the political and military significance of the last meeting between Hitler and Antonescu, on 5 August 1944, in the context of the disintegration of the German military potential. Coming to Wolfschanze together with Mihai Antonescu and Gen Ilie Steflea, the chief of the joint chiefs of staff, Ion Antonescu had conversations with Hitler, Keitel and Ribbentrop, culminating in a final, dramatic meeting of 5 and ½ hours with Hitler personally. The latter posed the precise question if, considering the defections in recent times, "Romania and especially its leader, Marshal Antonescu, were determined to follow Germany to the end." The chief of the Romanian state then conditioned his response on four major problems, regarding the German command's strategic intentions in the southern sector of the eastern front, Germany's capacity to provide antiaircraft defense for Romanian territory, the prospect of Turkey's involvement in the war--and thus the opening of the straits for the Anglo-American force--and the attitude of Germany's allies adjacent to Romania. The answers of Germany's leader were incoherent, demonstrating spotty information and, something much more serious, a visible tendency to substitute for the war's inexorable realities an exacerbated will centered around chimerical goals. The results of the meeting proved totally unsatisfactory for both parties, but, returning to the country, the leader of Romania hesitated to yet take any decisive action to disengage Romania from a visibly lost war, which made absolutely necessary the saving act on 23 August.

Col Dr Leonida Loghin, a sector chief at the Center for Studies and Research in Military History and Theory, pursued "The Evolution of the Manpower of the Romanian Army in the Battles for the Full Liberation of the National Territory and the Anti-Hitler War, Between 23 August 1944 and 9 May 1945." Engaging against the German forces 37 divisions, totaling nearly 540,000 soldiers, the Romanian army lost on the battlefields 169,822 fighters, including 21,035 dead (13.1 percent of the total losses). The strategic and tactical leadership of the Romanian units engaged in the anti-Hitler campaign was up to the mark and the bravery and spirit of sacrifice of the troops involved met and even exceeded the expectations, with the most pertinent

proof being the fact that "in this relatively short period of World War II, over 300,000 Romanian military personnel were decorated with various Romanian, Soviet and Czechoslovak war medals and orders for the feats of arms performed in the battles against the enemy."

Referring to the same period, Col Dr Constantin Toderascu dealt with "The Forms of Cultural Activity Performed in the Romanian Army During the Battles Waged for the Liberation of the Whole National Territory from Fascist Domination (September-October 1944)," when "new, glorious pages" were put "in the national epic, with the ancient right to the whole ancestral abode being confirmed once again through sacrifices." The educational action was performed then on all levels of the army, so that no soldier would ignore the just and liberating character of the anti-Hitler and anti-Horthy war. All means were used to this end, from the press to radio, photography, film and theater, there being published, among others, the periodical LA ARME, with a printing of 50,000 copies, twice per week, and a large number of pamphlets on propaganda and on the history of the homeland's heroes, read in many national-patriotic educational meetings. In these many ways "a contribution was made to the instilling of confidence in the justness of the cause for which the Romanian soldiers were fighting, to the instilling of confidence in victory."

A very important supply problem, namely "The Supply and Consumption of Ammunition in the Romanian Fourth Army During the Battles for the Liberation of the National Territory (September-October 1944)," was analyzed meticulously by Capt Alexandru Dutu. Determining precisely the general framework in which the battles occurred, the speaker indicated the conditions for supplying ammunition to the units engaged in battles from the advanced bases, especially from that at Urziceni (near Carei), set up on 25 October 1944. The consumption of ammunition, expressed very meticulously, according to calibers, was exceedingly high, sometimes, as it was possible to judge competently, even unduly high, it being nearly constant in inverse proportion to the rates of fire of the various elements of the artillery armament, which--along with the great variety of materiel to supply--was able to cause some supply problems. Valuable lessons were thus able to be obtained.

Lt Col (ret) Ion Dascalescu, a former elite fighting man in the battles in Budapest, under the command of Gen N. Sova, the commander of the C7A [VII Army Corps], dealt with "Some Aspects of the Actions of the Romanian C7A in the Battles in Budapest." The speaker analyzed the conditions under which it was possible to heroically repel the enemy counterattack launched on 4 January 1945 in the streets of Budapest. On 10 January, the Romanian 9th Cavalry Division and the Romanian 31st Infantry Regiment were engaged in battles in front of the Franz Joseph barracks and covered themselves with glory by means of their bravery. The conclusion of the paper stressed the psychological importance of "the experience of the people who gave life to the events," which allows the specialists in military history to combine as correctly as possible "the fact and the experiences of those who created them," with the presentation thus involving valuable spiritual depths.

The extensive and documented presentation by Col Dr Constantin Ucrain, involving "Considerations Regarding the Use of Romanian Artillery in the Fighting in Localities," also fitted into the context of the anti-Hitler campaign. On the western front, the Romanian army liberated 3,831 localities (872 Romanian, 1,237 Hungarian and 1,722 Czechoslovak), in many cases as a result of bold and rapid maneuvers, as was the case with the localities of Banovce, Kromeric, Selesovce, Vajani and so on.

The use of the centralized fire of the artillery was of great value in these battles, and the accuracy and effectiveness of the fire of the artillery enabled the Romanian infantry and the mountain troops to obtain great tactical successes. In addition to the actions in support of the infantry, the Romanian artillery also performed important firing for neutralization of the enemy, bringing out the fact that the firing by direct aim had a higher percentage than the firing done from positions under cover. The fire of the artillery was concentrated especially on well-defined objectives in the terrain, in order to thus permit the use of small units and make as substantial a savings of ammunition as possible. The experience demonstrated that the actions to conquer localities obtain more success by surprise and result in lower losses when they are performed at night.

The last paper in the third section of the session was presented by scientific researcher Stefan Paslaru and described the role played by the army in the country's political life in the first years of the socialist revolution and construction. Right from the start, the Romanian Communist Party understood to devote special attention to providing a strong link between the country's military organism and the people, by achieving a climate favorable to osmosis between the people and the army. Within the framework of this policy, a full right to vote was given to all military personnel and intense political work and wide cultural activity were performed within the army. The military deputies (11 in the Grand National Assembly in 1948) constituted an active presence in the discussion and adoption of the various bills--especially Gen Iacob Teclu and Sgt Matei I. Tanase, who participated in the discussion of the new constitution.

The army was always an active presence in the thick of domestic political events, participating on 3 December 1950 in the first elections for the regional, district, city and communal people's councils. As vivid proof of the prestige that the army had among the people, hundreds of military deputies were elected under these conditions. Likewise, at the 13th session of the Grand National Assembly, in September 1952, the officers, sergeants and soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Romanian People's Republic participated actively in the discussion of the draft of the new constitution. In the elections for the Grand National Assembly, held on 30 November 1952, 16 representatives of the Romanian army were also elected, and in the elections for the people's councils, held on 20 December 1953, 295 military personnel were elected to the communal people's councils, 221 to the district people's councils, 46 to the regional people's councils and 311 to the city people's councils--thus 873 military personnel in all.

From then until now, the army has remained the same vigorous presence in the whole political life of the homeland, participating actively and intensely in the discussion and adoption of the decisions and in the accomplishments of the foreign and domestic policy of the Romanian state.

The proceedings of the 3d section, devoted to the history of the art of war, within the Military Academy's 18th session of scientific papers, thus ended with this so impressive balance sheet. All the papers were at a high scientific and patriotic level, explained many important problems, brought new elements, documentation and perspectives to polemology, so that the balance sheet of the session remains completely positive.

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OFFICIAL NOTES NATIONALISM IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 81 p 7

[Summary of radio interview with Mato Andric, Bosnia-Hercegovina republic secretary for internal affairs, by Radio Sarajevo in Sarajevo 12 May 1981 on the program "Open Studio": "The Enemy Has Been Left Isolated"]

[Text] "Tito's approach to current problems, in which he put the interests of the workingman at the center of the political-ideological battle, has strengthened the moral and political unity of the people and has reinforced the conviction that the League of Communists, along with the working class and the working people, will not only defend, but will also effectively develop, the revolution on the course which we have sketched out with Tito," said Mato Andric, Bosnia-Hercegovina republic secretary for internal affairs, in an interview last night over Radio Sarajevo on the program "Open Studio."

As he put it, "it is precisely feelings of this kind that have become strongly manifested in SR [Socialist Republic] Bosnia-Hercegovina and which have had the dominant influence on people's disposition and the security situation in our republic."

Intensified Activity of Oppositionists

Speaking about certain characteristics of the security situation in the recent past, Andric said that we are constantly exposed to propaganda, subversive and other activities belonging to the arsenal of so-called special warfare. He then said: "It has turned out that we were not wrong a few years ago when we made the assessment that at the time when we were left without Tito both the external and internal enemies would step up their activity to weaken and destabilize Yugoslavia. Their behavior along that line soon became manifest. Certain renegades such as Djilas and others immediately rushed to attack Tito and his work in the most flagrant way. Nationalists of all stripes, liberals, anarcholiberals, dogmatists and others began to step up their activity. They began to make contact with one another at a greater rate and attempted to harness together the enemies belonging to different ideological commitments. However, our people, and especially the working class, have been condemning behavior of this kind, and the enemies have been left isolated."

The moderator of the program, Radio Sarajevo editor Nada Savic, stressing that our people should be spoken to openly about all problems, asked about certain characteristics of the activity of enemies, especially extremist political emigres.

"Since the triumph of our revolution, which was carried out through a struggle carried by all our nationalities and ethnic minorities, we have been confronted with the need for constant concern to defend it," Mato Andric said. "On the one hand we have come into conflict with remnants of the old class structures, and on the other with opponents who are not suited by democratic, self-managed and nonaligned Yugoslavia. We have come into conflict with dogmatists, technobureaucrats and proponents of a 'firm-handed' policy, with nationalist separatists, and with hegemonists and others representing ideological commitments opposed to the League of Communists. Though they do not represent a disturbing force and influence, the hostile tendencies which are always present are nevertheless fed either by external factors or by domestic difficulties, and usually by both.

"After all, our conditions in the area we occupy objectively signify that there are claims toward our country and constant efforts to direct the streams of its development according to the desires of one side or another.

"When we bear this in mind, then it is no wonder that we have had renegades, from supporters of the Cominform to those who plotted the so-called 'democratic alternatives,' individuals and groups who have put themselves at the service of alien interests."

Nothing Surprises Us

"At the moment the nationalists within the country and the fascist emigre community outside are showing the greatest aggressiveness. Nor are we surprised even by the fact that they have found themselves on the same platform. The directions of their attack and the methods they use are well known to us. The nationalists, be they Croat, Serb or Moslem, have always centered their attack on our most cherished social values, above all the cohesiveness of our nationalities and ethnic minorities, and they use in this hackneyed slogans about how certain nationalities have disenfranchised the others and similar speculations. Provocative types of behavior have again cropped up recently, such as the singing of nationalist songs, the display of national symbols without socialist insignia, the writing of anonymous letters with chauvinistic content and the like. All these things are taking place, though, to be sure, they have not taken a pronounced form, but are quite enough to serve as a warning that nationalism does exist and that it has a tendency to become more vigorous.

"Yet their activity has not been limited to these forms alone. There are also others which are considerably more perfidious and which crop up predominantly in more confined quarters. Attempts are made to exert an adverse influence, especially on young people through inaccurate interpretation of events from the National Liberation Struggle, even to the point of portraying the Ustashi, the Chetniks and other traitors in a better light, equating them with the people whom they betrayed, to the effect that the atrocities were committed by certain traitors, but not by all of them, and so on.

"And the nationalists attempt to portray all current events in a manner which sows distrust of the nationalities toward one another.

"The nationalistic platform has been adopted by all our enemies since in their judgment they can inflict the greatest blows on us from those positions. Certain extremists have committed themselves openly, and they are using various forms, beginning with meetings for charitable purposes and other spontaneous assemblies, and going all the way to abuse of religious instruction.

"One of the things that Comrade Tito said in speaking about these issues to a delegation of SR Bosnia-Hercegovina in Bugojno on 25 November 1979 was this: 'The attacks against the foundations on which the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina was erected have not ceased. Well, that is only one more piece of evidence that our vigilance must not become slack. Don't allow anyone to serve as a go-between and disrupt relations among the nationalities in Bosnia-Hercegovina.... It is good, then, that you have now taken strict measures against the subversive activity of certain clerical circles. Such attempts should be nipped in the bud, with harsh measures if that is necessary. Preserve brotherhood and unity. It is the pledge of our existence and of our successful development in the future, the pledge of our future.' So, that is what Comrade Tito said during his last visit to SR Bosnia-Hercegovina, 5 months before his death. From him we inherited brotherhood and unity as an achievement of our socialist Yugoslavia, and we are doing everything to nurture it and constantly strengthen and reinforce it. For that reason we have been very resolute in suppressing nationalistic manifestations."

Nationalism Has Been Cut Short

"In SR Bosnia-Hercegovina, as you know, nationalists and chauvinists have been exposed politically and legally prosecuted, especially those whose activity took on public forms. Nor have we been blind to the camouflaged methods and activity in confined circles. We have even poked into certain 'dens' where nationalists were gathering and 'sharpening' their chauvinistic teeth. Wherever this showed a tendency to spread, we cut short manifestations of this kind by political action and legal penalties. It is well known that we brought individuals to court in Banjaluka, Gorazde, Tuzla, Doboj and other towns. In addition we have warned individuals, and we hope that they will correct their behavior. Should they not do so, they will bear all the consequences."

Mato Andric emphasized the following particularly:

"Even though in recent years the emigre community has not conducted a single planned action within the country, these people have not renounced their intentions, and are stepping up their preparations. They are seeking allies among nationalists and other opponents of socialist self-managed Yugoslavia so as to establish their points of support in the country and carry out terrorist actions with their help. We will be monitoring their endeavors and exposing and prosecuting their contacts."

One of the questions had to do with economic crimes. The republic secretary for internal affairs noted that this type of harmful activity has been on the rise during last year and the first months of this year, which is probably the consequence of well-known disturbances on the market and certain other circumstances.

"The number of crimes described as theft of public property has grown particularly," Mato Andric said. "There have been a few involving amounts that reached or exceeded the figure of a million dinars. Tighter accountability and closer supervision of the work of authorized persons have turned up more crimes than before involving abuse of official position, bribery and the like. All such cases have been 'branded' and judged as acts that are in the sharpest opposition to the ethics our society is developing."

The Fight Against Criminals

"The resolutions of the 13th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee and the 11th Meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina have motivated party members, working people and citizens to be more vigilant and to act more vigorously in suppressing these manifestations. However, the conditions which favor them have not yet been corrected in certain quarters. Insufficient vigilance, excessive power of individuals, the absence of everyday control and prompt accountability to the working people, as well as the entrusting of property with irresponsible persons have left room for individuals to commit criminal acts. In spite of all the warnings and the legal prohibitions, there are cases when people who have committed crimes are again hired for positions in which they can commit the same crimes. To be sure, this is not happening often, but it needs to be pointed out. In any case, the fight on the crime front is being developed more and more."

For quite some time now there have been no serious outrages in our republic with respect to public peace and order.

"The situation with respect to public peace and order is increasingly favorable as the system of social self-protection develops and as individuals become more sophisticated about security," Andric said. "In our republic it is a long time since we have had the serious forms of disruption such as outbreaks of chauvinism by groups, melees, or other disorders involving a sizable number of participants. Usually it is a question of outbreaks by individuals in coffeehouses or other meeting places, and alcohol is involved. If the owners of restaurants acted more responsibly, the number of these occurrences would decrease considerably.

"In carrying out the tasks and functions of maintaining public peace and order the members of the police have been performing their duties with ever greater professionalism and effectiveness, and repressive measures, especially those drastic ones, have been used less and less."

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CLERICALISM CITED IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 81 p 7

[Article by Dj. Kozar]

[Excerpts] Relations between religious communities and the public authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, taken as a whole, have been improving, there are almost no problems or misunderstandings, since in principle these communities accept the fundamental provisions of the constitution in this domain, Seid Maglajlija said in yesterday's meeting of the Presidium of the Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Bosnia-Hercegovina which he chaired.

Confession or nonconfession of faith is understood and is in reality treated as a free and private affair of every man, and religious interests and needs are respected and honored unless they are in opposition with other interests of our socialist self-managed society.

Most religious officers have adopted and adhered to this fundamental position, which was made evident in the meeting in the discussion by representatives of the religious communities who are delegates to the Republic Conference of the SAWP: the Roman Catholic priest Vlado Karlovic, the Orthodox priest Krstan Bijeljac, and the imam Mustafa Nurikic. This observation is supported by two exceptionally important figures: about 250 priests are involved in various forms of activity of the Socialist Alliance, and our cultural and historical legacy, which is in the possession of the churches and mosques, is being very well attended to and cared for.

But these relations are not set down once and for all, and they therefore must be constantly developed, improved and nurtured, from the local community and opstina to the republic. Two adverse tendencies--clericalism in the ranks of religious communities and sectarianism in certain public agencies--have always been a hindrance to this cooperation. The struggle against both tendencies, though the results have been rather good, should persist on an everyday basis so long as there are priests who cannot reconcile themselves to living in this society the way it is and so long as there are people in our public agencies who are of a dogmatic and bureaucratic mind or who are not familiar with the basic freedoms provided for in the constitution.

Clericalism and Sectarianism

What do the most recent occurrences in this area show?

Clericalism has been occurring both openly and surreptitiously, depending on what the conditions allow. Put simply, there has been abuse of religion for political purposes, attempts have been made to give the religious communities a significance which leads them away from worship and brings them closer to a partnership with certain entities in society. Among the clericalists there are not only known opponents to our society within the clergy, but also oppositionists who would like to use religion as a cover for continuing their oppositionist activity (they become members of church committees or Islam district committees), as well as a number of so-called laymen who tend in the direction of mediation between religion and society.

The activity of clericalist circles within the religious communities is aimed at portraying itself as a traditional manifestational form of church organization vis-a-vis a society which allegedly is taking on its modern dimensions in the form of adaptation of religious organizations to the new conditions. The purpose here is actually to disguise the real essence of the activity of those circles, since it is a question of a very deliberate propaganda campaign by conservative forces within the religious communities.

Sectarianism, which crops up here and there, is aimed, to put it most briefly, at frustrating those definite religious freedoms. This is especially manifested with respect to specific issues, when an inability to understand the position of religions and religious communities in our country is manifested. Sectarianism clearly could feed certain manifestations in the church and mosque, especially if some precedent elevates it to the level of the rule. There is every reason to make a distinction between deliberate resistance and ignorance.

Clericalism

In his introductory address Muhsin Nalic spoke, inter alia, about extrareligious activity which has been noted in certain quarters. As he put it, this refers to the farewell party of pilgrims to Mecca in Cazin Opstina, where they marched in a column through settlements carrying both national and religious flags, and in honor of the farewell they shot off hunting rifles and firecrackers; the opening of a Catholic Church in Kocherin in Hercegovina, which was devoted to marking the anniversary of the "13th Century of Christianity Among the Croats," where tricolor flags appeared without the socialist symbols; the welcoming of the highest representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the jurisdiction of the Zvornik-Tuzla Episcopate, where church symbols were worn, slogans with religious content were shouted, and posters were displayed inviting people to this welcome rally.

"All of this took place far outside the places designated by law and because of their content took on a clerical-nationalistic intonation and exceeded the limits within which religious communities freely perform religious services and conduct religious business," Nalic concluded.

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BRIEFS

SCHOOL EXPULSIONS IN DECANI OPSTINA--The LC opstina committee of Decani has taken political and administrative measures against those responsible for hostile activities: 20 students of the "Vellezerit Frasheri" secondary school were expelled for distributing slogans with hostile content, while the following persons from this school were expelled from the LC because of their hostile action: Din Ahmetaj, professor of English, Abdullah Hasanmetaj and Muhamet Haklaj, mathematics teachers, as well as the student Sokol Gjocaj. The first three, along with Hasan Ukehazhajn, professor of Albanian, and Jashar Salihajn, professor of English, were suspended from their jobs and all are in custody. For organizing hostile action and not stopping action within his elementary school, Ismail Hardinaj, physical education teacher at the "Drita" elementary school in Gramocel, was suspended from his job. Because of lack of vigilance toward hostile actions two LC members were removed in Decani, four others were given warnings, while members of the basic LC organizations in the Petar Prla elementary school in Istinic and the "Bajram Curri" school in Gornji Streoc were criticized. Five members of the organization of reserve officers from Decani Opstina were expelled because of opportunism and lack of vigilance in preventing hostile actions. [Excerpt] [Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 19 May 81 p 5]

PROFESSORS SUSPENDED IN DJAKOVICA--At a meeting on 19 May of the basic LC organizations in the "Hajdar Dushi" general secondary school and the "Nexhmedin Nixha" technical scientific secondary school in Djakovica two professors were removed from their jobs; namely, Muhamet Rogova, Albanian language and literature professor, from the first school, and Xhavit Hoxha, geography professor from the second school, who were said to have tried to organize hostile actions, for which they are now in custody. One student was suspended from school and sentenced to 60 days in prison for participating in the 2 April riots in Djakovica and four others were suspended from school for opposing the platform of the LCY organs in the secondary school center. [Excerpt] [Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 21 May 81 p 5]

EXPULSIONS IN UROSEVAC--Up to now 14 workers [named] have been expelled from the LC organization in the "Tefik Canga" wood combine in Urosevac. Two elementary school teachers [named] from Tankosic [Urosevac Opstina] who acted from hostile positions were expelled from the LC and suspended from their jobs. The following were also suspended from their jobs and expelled from the LC: Atifete Ramadani, worker at the Urosevac United Bank, as well as Fadil Kallaba, technician, and Mileke Hoxha, white-collar worker, who were employed at the electric iron plant, because of their views which were counter to the party line. Two workers [named] at the Urosevac "Jugopetrol" work organization were suspended from their jobs, one for his nationalist positions, the other, because of his participation in the demonstrations. [Excerpts] [Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 21 May 81 p 5]

SCHOOL EXPULSIONS IN PODUJEVO--Isak Musliu, history teacher, and Muhamet Bllaca, Albanian language teacher, at the "8 Nentory" secondary school in Podujevo, were expelled from the LC for irresponsible and ineffectual behavior in executing their duties and because they are suspected of supporting the hostile actions which occurred in this opstina. Seven students [named] from this school were also expelled from the party for not preventing the demonstrations or for participating in some of them. Also, four teachers were given final party warnings for lack of vigilance and four others were given warnings because they failed to act when they should have. Seven other teachers were dismissed from their jobs and 25 students expelled from the school for participating in the demonstrations or for supporting the demonstrations. Parallel with the ideological differentiation, this LC organization is developing action to renew and rejuvenate the organization. Thus, one teacher and three students whose actions have been consistent with the revolutionary course of the LCY and of Comrade Tito, were admitted to the LC. [Excerpt] [Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 21 May 81 p 5]

MONTENEGRIN REASSESSMENT OF ALBANIAN RELATIONS--The Montenegrin economy is prepared to honor and carry out all commercial agreements in its relations with the economy of Albania, but in the future it will maintain strict reciprocity and will not do anything that might be damaging to us, a fact which has not been given enough consideration up to now. Several cases were mentioned at a meeting of the committee for economic relations with foreign countries of the Montenegrin Economic Chamber in which work and other organizations in Montenegro deviated from the usual international agreements in order to stimulate and improve relations with Albania. In future such conduct cannot be tolerated, considering the present political conditions. Mentioned also were excessively charitable arrangements which permitted the entrance into and transit through our country of 2,000 Albanian vehicles [a year] compared to an agreement to permit only 30 Yugoslav vehicles to use roads in Albania annually. The committee decided that a special group should reexamine all current business arrangements and make appropriate suggestions to the Economic Chamber regarding conduct in further cooperation with Albania. [Excerpt] [Belgrade PRIVREDNI PREGLED in Serbo-Croatian 22 May 81 p 12]

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